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TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION
DETERRENCE
ANITA SINHA*

Abstract: The governance of global migration increasingly relies on what critical migration scholarship refers to as externalized control. Externalization encompasses limiting human mobility through the imposition of migration control
measures by transit states, as well as by states that are geographically proximate
to destination states. Destination states are at a minimum complicit in the creation and operation of these externalized migration control systems. To capture
this phenomenon, this Article offers a reconceptualization of externalization as
transnational migration deterrence. The objective of this nomenclature is to provide a framework that highlights the role of destination states, to build a lexicon
of accountability for extraterritorial human rights violations against migrants.
Transnational migration deterrence systems often arise through ad hoc policies
and practices, typically as a response to a migration "crisis," and continue thereafter as long-lasting mechanisms of regional migration control. Destination
states typically provide assistance for less-resourced states to carry out migration
control on their behalf through financial and logistical support, while also levying threats if they fail to deter migration. This Article begins with transnational
migration deterrence in the Americas, describing first the historical context of
the U.S.-Caribbean migrant deterrence system and then present-day migration
control practices between the United States, Mexico, and Central America. It
then turns to the transnational migration deterrence systems in Europe and Australia, chronicling arrangements of interdiction at sea and offshore detention in
both regions. The Article concludes by exploring a framework of accountability
that recognizes the relational nature of how externalized migration controls are
operationalized, emphasizing the need for systems of accountability with respect
to destination countries' role in migration deterrence practices.
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INTRODUCTION

Our own era . .. seems to be that of space. We are in the age of the simultaneous, ofjuxtaposition, the near andthe far, the side by side and the scattered.
Michel Foucault
Neighbor is not a geographicterm. It is a moral concept.2
-Rabbi

Joachim Prinz

The relationship between responsibility and distance in the context of
global migration must be reconceptualized in order to safeguard the rights of
vulnerable migrants and preserve the integrity of the international human
rights protection regime. 3 Global North states that are migrants' intended destination have been increasingly devising ways to prevent migrants from reaching their borders. As a result, developing states today accommodate 80% of the
world's refugees. 4 Migration routes are increasingly more dangerous to traverse,5 and there are near-constant images and reports of migrant deaths in de1Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces: UtopiasandHeterotopias,in RETHINKING ARCHITECTURE:
A READER IN CULTURAL THEORY 330, 350 (Neil Leach ed., 1997) (emphasis added).
2 Joachim Prinz, Speech at the March on Washington (Aug. 28, 1963) (transcript
available at
https://jwa.org/media/rabbi-joachim-prinz-speech-at-march-on-washington [https://perma.cc/JWP4WR2B]) (emphasis added).
s Scholars have been calling for a significant re-examination and overhaul of the governance of
migration law. See ALEXANDER BETTS & PAUL COLLIER, REFUGE: TRANSFORMING A BROKEN REF-

UGEE SYSTEM 201 (2017) ("The institutions created to protect the world's refugees are failing. Global
governance exists to facilitate international cooperation, and yet with the highest number of refugees
in the regime's history, we have the lowest levels of responsibility-sharing."); Hiroshi Motomura, The
New Migration Law: Migrants, Refugees, and Citizens in anAnxiousAge, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 457,
458 (2020) ("Once every generation or so, entire fields of law require a full reset.... This moment
has come for the law governing migration."). This Article endeavors to contribute to the effort to
reconceptualize and reconfigure global migration governance.
4 GurminderK. Bhambra, The CurrentCrisis ofEurope: Refugees, Colonialism, andthe Limits of
Cosmopolitanism, 23 EUR. L.J. 395, 396 (2017) (challengingthe concept of "cosmopolitan Europe,"
noting that "Europe is the richest continent on the planet, yet it takes the smallest proportion of the
world's refugees"); see also BETTS & COLLIER, supra note 3, at 128 ("Refugees are just over 0.3 per
cent of the world's population. The challenge is not one of absolute numbers but of geographical concentration."); Matthew J. Gibney, Refugees andJustice Between States, 14 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 448,
450 (2015) (noting that developing countries receive over 80% of refugees globally, a figure that "is
10% higher than it was a decade ago"); Tally Kritzman-Amir & Yonatan Berman, Responsibility
Sharing and the Rights ofRefugees: The Case of Israel, 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 619, 624
(2010) (stating that the Global South and "the least politically and economically capable countries"
have continued to disproportionately bear the burden of hosting migrants as the Global North increasingly restricts immigration).
5Natascha Zaun
& Olivia Nantermoz, The Use ofPseudo-CausalNarrativesin EUPolicies:The
Case of the European Union Emergency Trust Fundfor Africa, 29 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 510, 525
(2021) ("[T]he assertion that strengthening border control and ending rescue operations at sea will
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serts and washed-up cadavers from drownings in rivers and seas. 6 Migration
detention practices have proliferated globally, and often are sites of deplorable
and abusive conditions. 7 The rhetorical repetition casting migration flows as
"crises" inhibits the implementation of solutions that balance the needs of vulnerable migrants with state sovereignty.8
In this context, externalization of migration control efforts has become the
norm. Externalization describes extraterritorial state influence over, or involvement in, mechanisms that prevent migrants from crossing the physical
border of a destination state. 9 One prominent migration scholar, in analyzing
migration in a "[t]ransnational [c]ontext," notes that destination states can no
longer rely on unilateral responses and instead have entered into cooperative
agreements to deter migration. 1 These agreements are a continuation of "longstanding" efforts to respond to migration via "extraterritorial responses."" Cooperative arrangements have the potential to go beyond "the traditional narrow
focus on outsourced border control" and may include measures such as economic development aid to address the root causes of migration.12
stop irregular migration is not supported by evidence. Instead, these measures have been found to
divert migrants towards more dangerous routes, encouraging recourse to smuggling networks, and
more generally, increasing the risk of deaths at sea." (first citing Wayne A. Cornelius & Idean Salehyan,
Does Border Enforcement Deter UnauthorizedImmigration? The Case of Mexican Migration to the
UnitedStates, 1 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 139 (2007); and then citingEUGENIO CUSUMANO&MATTEO
VILLA, ROBERT SCHUMAN CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUD., MIGRATIONPOL'Y CTR., SEAR RESCUE NGOS:

A PULL FACTOR OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION? (2019), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/
65024/PB_2019_22 MPC.pdf [https://penna.cc/V4WC-W8WX])); Clare Cummings, Julia Pacitto,
Diletta Lauro & Marta Foresti, Why People Move: Understandingthe Driversand Trends ofMigration to Europe 7 (Overseas Dev. Inst., Working Paper No. 430, 2015), https://cdn.odi.org/media/
documents/10485.pdf [perma.cc/SZ42-XXN7].
6
Marie McAuliffe, AdrianKitimbo, Alexandra M. Goossens & AkmAhsanUllah, Understanding
MigrationJourneysfrom Migrants 'Perspectives,in INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, WORLD MIGRATION
REPORT 2018, at 171, 171 (Marie McAuliffe & Martin Ruhs eds., 2018), https://publications.iom.int/
books/world-migration-report-2018 [https://perma.cc/M4RL-YUT6] (noting "the increasing visibility
of dangerous and sometimes deadly migration journeys"); Cetta Mainwaring & Noelle Brigden, Beyond the Border: ClandestineMigrationJourneys, 21 GEOPOLITICS 243, 243 (2016) ("Not a week
goes by without media reports of migrant boats capsizing in the Mediterranean and corpses washing
ashore . . of people dying in hidden compartments in trucks or transport containers .... ").
' See, e.g., infra notes 125-135 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text; see also E. Tendayi Achiume, MigrationasDecolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1517 (2019) (disputing "the logic of [the] dogmatic account of
territorial nation-state sovereignty where encounters between Third World peoples and First World
nation-states are concerned").
9Lori A. Nessel, ExternalizedBordersand the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. H.R.L. REV. 629-

30 (2009).
Motomura, supra note 3, at 499.
" Id. at 510.
2Id. at 510-11. Professor Motomura raises this possibility with several caveats. See id. at 51117. He ultimately concludes "that though economic development may seem promising as a major
element in responses to migration, many arrangements are seriously flawed." Id. at 517.
1
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This Article reframes these arrangements as transnational migration deterrence to encourage a linguistic shift that expands the critical conversation
about modern migration beyond this traditional narrow focus.1 3 Importantly,
the framework of transnational migration deterrence, which captures the affirmative steps taken by states that seek to curb the mobility of migrants, contemplates accountability mechanisms that hold destination states responsible
for human rights violations beyond their borders. Relatively wealthy destination states have increasingly made arrangements where other, less-resourced
states do the work of migration control for them. These practices fall squarely
within the definition of transnationalism proffered by geography scholars,
namely "work of the state that crosses national boundaries."14
Transnational migration deterrence can involve a migrant's country of
origin-that is, the sending country-and increasingly includes deterrence systems in countries migrants travel through to reach their destination. As noted
above, these transit states' 5 tend to be countries with far fewer resources than
the destination state.1 6 Destination states also are increasingly enlisting nontransit neighboring countries to restrict migrants' mobility. The United Nations
International Law Commission describes the state actors involved in what are
potentially transnational human rights violations as assisting (destination)
states and acting (sending, transit, and/or neighboring) states.' 7 These various
transnational arrangements have resulted in human rights violations against
migrants, including violations ofthe principle of non-refoulementand exploitation and abuse by state and non-state actors.18

13 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway, Non-refoulementin a WorldofCooperative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235, 241 (2015) (describing "the politics of nonentree" as states instituting "policies that seek to keep most refugees from accessing theirjurisdiction,
and thus being in a position to assert their entitlement to the benefits of refugee law").
14

JENNA M. LOYD & ALISON MOUNTZ, BOATS, BORDERS, AND BASES: RACE, THE COLD WAR,
AND THE RISE OF MIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (2018) (first citing Alison

Mountz, Specters at the PortofEntry: UnderstandingState Mobilities Through an Ontology ofExclusion, 6 MOBILITIES 317 (2011); and then citing Alison Mountz & Nancy Hiemstra, Chaos andCrisis:
Dissectingthe SpatiotemporalLogics of ContemporaryMigrationsandState Practices,104 ANNALS
ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 382 (2013)).
15 Antje Missbach & Melissa Phillips, ReconceptualizingTransitStates in an Era of Outsourcing,
Offshoring, and Obfuscation, 3 MIGRATION & SOC'Y 19, 19 (2020) ("[T]ransit states canbe understood
as countries through which migrants .. .try to pass on their way to another destination country.").
16 Destination states often initiate transnational migration control claiming that the intent is to
assist these less-resourwed states with migration control and management. See Bill Frelick, Ian M.
Kysel & Jennifer Podkul, The Impact ofExternalizationofMigrationControls on the Rights ofAsylum Seekers and Other Migrants, 4 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 190, 194 (2016) ("Externalization
occurs through formalized migration policies and visa regimes, throughbilateral and multilateral policy initiatives between states, as well as through ad hoc policies and practices.").
17 See infra notes 320-325 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 267-288 and accompanying
text.
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The scholarship analyzing the phenomenon of externalization with respect to migration control has accomplished the critically important work of
presenting how states regionally and globally restrict migrants' mobility beyond their territorial borders. There is a spectrum oftheories about what physical borders now signify-from ubiquitous and multidirectional to shifting and
even vanishing-with the growing global reliance on transnational migration
deterrence.1 9 This Article builds upon this literature and addresses why and
how to hold destination states accountable for human rights violations within
systems that execute migration deterrence extraterritorially, given the central,
and in many cases decisive, role these states play in the creation and/or operation of these mechanisms.
Transnational migration deterrence systems are typically instituted
through "ad hoc policies and practices," 20 often as a response to a constructed
"migration crisis." 2' Destination states often operationalize transnational deterrence mechanisms via financial and logistical support, or simply issue threats
to withhold aid or impose tariffs. Transnational deterrence also is achieved
through visa requirements. Notable examples include Canada mandating that
Czech Roma refugees obtain visas to deter their migration in the late 1990s
19 David Scott FitzGerald, Remote Control ofMigration: TheorisingTerritoriality, SharedCoercion, andDeterrence,46 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 4, 5 (2020) ("There is no consensus on how
far contemporary practices have reshaped classical understandings of borders and sovereignty."); see

David Lyon, The Border Is Everyw here: ID Cards, Surveillance and the Other, in GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE AND POLICING: BORDERS, SECURITY, IDENTITY 66,78-94 (Elia Zureik & Mark B. Salter eds.,

2005) (exemplifying the ubiquitous theory of borders); Cecilia Menjivar, Immigration Law Beyond
Borders: ExternalizingandInternalizingBorder Controlsin an Era ofSecuritization, 10 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 353, 357 (2014) ("The externalization (or outsourcing) of borders . . creates a situation in which admission decisions, which are normally the purview of immigration inspectors at ports
of entry, or the frontline gatekeepers, are no longer confined to these spaces or at the physical border
.... " (citing Janet A. Gilboy, Deciding Who GetsIn: Decisionmakingby ImmigrationInspectors, 25
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 571 (1991))); Ayelet Shachar, Bordering Migration/MigratingBorders, 37
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 93, 100 (2019) (exemplifying the shifting theory of borders).
20 Frelick et al., supra note 16, at 194.

2

See REBECCA HAMLIN, CROSSING: HOW WE LABEL AND REACT TO PEOPLE ON THE MOVE

124 (2021) ("The term 'crisis' in relation to border crossing situations is frequently deployed not in
relation to the human suffering that is being experienced, but in relation to the reaction of citizens and
politicians in wealthy receiving states."); Catherine Powell, Race, Gender, and Nation in an Age of
Shifting Borders: The Unstable Prisms ofMotherhood andMasculinity, 24 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 133, 158 (2020) (describing the Trump Administration, in order to curtail migration, to
have "manufactured a crisis at the U.S-Mexico border as a basis for shifting borders outwards");
Anita Sinha, Defining Detention: The Intervention of the European Court of Human Rights in the

Detention ofInvoluntaryMigrants, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 176, 187 (2019) ("[The] persistent
characterization of the movement of people across borders as unpredictable crises justifies, often to
the extent of necessitating, a securitization response to migration."); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration
Emergencies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 613 (2017) ("[Migration] crises are constructed by the architecture of the international migration law framework, which is excessively dependent on the antiquated
refugee regime.").
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and European countries requiring visas for refugees from the Bosnian War.22
Finally, transnational migration deterrence can be executed by non-state actors,
such as transportation carriers 23 and private entities more broadly.24
Migration detention increasingly has become an integral feature of transnational migration deterrence. Detention has proliferated in destination states,
and is increasingly present in transit states and non-transit states geographically proximate to destination states.25 States have attempted to avoid the designation of this practice as migration detention by using euphemisms such as registration camps, reception centers, hot spots, and border zone camps. 26 In a simi" Satvinder Juss, Toward a Morally Legitimate Reform ofRefugee Law: The Uses of Cultural
Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 311, 322 (1998); Gerald Kernerman, Refugee Interdiction
Before Heaven 's Gate, 43 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 230, 234 (2008).
2 Gallya Lahav, Migration and Security: The Role ofNon-state Actors and Civil Liberties in
LiberalDemocracies, in UNITED NATIONS, SECOND COORDINATION MEETING ON INTERNATIONAL

MIGRATION 89, 102 (2013) https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/2/ITT_
COOR2_CH16 Lahav.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MKE-QWK7] (exploring the role of airlines and other
private transit companies as gatekeepers of transnational movement).
24 Ana L6pez-Sala & Dirk Godenau, In PrivateHands? The Markets ofMigration andthe Politics of Outsourcing, J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD., Dec. 14, 2020, at 1, 1-10, https://www.tandf
online.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1857229 [https://perma.cc/48A7-5Y8Z]; Daria Davitti,
The Rise of PrivateMilitaryandSecurity Companiesin European Union MigrationPolicies:Implications Under the UNGPs, 4 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 33, 34-41 (2019). States have used private actors to
deter migration starting as early as the eighteenth century, by fining shipmasters for not performing pre-boarding screenings for unauthorized migrants. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ExtraterritorialHuman Rights Obligations in Regard to Refugees and Migrants, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK ON EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 153, 154 (Mark Gibney, Gamze
Erdem Turkelli, Markus Krajewski & Wouter Vandenhole eds., 2022).
25 Michael Flynn, How and Why Immigration Detention Crossedthe Globe 4 (Global Detention
Project, Working Paper No. 8, 2014), https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/04/How-and-Why-Immigration-Detention-Crossed-the-Globe-GDP-WP8-1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6D8C-MSBQ] ("From Mexico to the Bahamas, Mauritania to Lebanon, Turkey to Saudi Arabia,
South Africa to Indonesia, Malaysia to Thailand, detention has become an established modus operandi
that counts on dedicated facilities andburgeoning institutional bureaucracies. Before the decade of the
1980s, on the other hand, detention appears to have been largely an ad hoc tool, employed mainly by
wealthy states in exigent circumstances .... "); see also Admir Skodo, How Immigration Detention
ComparesAround the World, THE CONVERSATION, https://theconversation.com/how-immigrationdetention-compares-around-the-world-76067 [https://perma.cc/9GP9-M5TS] (Apr. 22,2017) ("Since
the 1980s, all major Western states practice what they call civil or administrative confinement of undocumented immigrants and non-citizens."); Robyn Sampson & Grant Mitchell, Global Trends in
ImmigrationDetention andAlternativesto Detention:Practical,PoliticalandSymbolic Rationales, 1
J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 97, 101 (2013) ("The best evidence of the growing global population
of detainees can be found in estimates of the total detention capacity for individual countries.").
26

OPEN ACCESS NOW, THE HIDDEN FACE OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CAMPS IN EUROPE,

at

2F (2014), http://www.epim.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/1A-The-hidden-face-of-immigrationdetention-camps-in-Europe-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY9T-GEBL]; GLOB. DET. PROJECT, HUNGARY
IMMIGRATION DETENTION PROFILE 18(2016), https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/Hungary_immigration detention _reportupdated.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU8X-A42X]
(describing a "transit zone" as a closed, fenced, heavily guarded complex that uses shipping containers
near its border with Serbia).
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lar vein, mechanisms designated as "processing cent[ers]" are de facto detention centers,27 and refugee camps are often functionally open-air prisons. 28 The
proliferation of these sites, despite attempts to cloak the causal link by tweaking terminology, demonstrates in fact that border deterrence and detention are
interrelated practices. 29 Notably, the increased use of detention as a tool for
migration control has not abated unauthorized migration. 30 It has affected,
" Franzisca Zanker, Managing orRestrictingMovement? DivergingApproaches ofAfrican and
European MigrationGovernance, COMPAR. MIGRATION STUD., May 8, 2019, at 1, 5 (quoting the

African Union chair of a 2015 summit between the EU and African partners dedicated to migration:
"processing centres, or whatever they may be called, are de facto detention centres that will constitute
a seriousviolation of human rightsand re-victimization of migrants" (quoting Chairperson Nkosazana
Dlamini Zuma)); see also MARK AKKERMAN, OUTSOURCING OPPRESSION: HOWEUROPEEXTERNAL-

&

ISES MIGRANT DETENTION BEYOND ITS SHORES 4 (Niamh Ni Bhriain & Josephine Valeske eds.,
2021), https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8PLA-Z6P9] ("There is a plethora of terms used to describe the facilities funded by the EU
and its member states, from detention centres to accommodation settings to disembarkation platforms,
but regardless of the chosen term, the underlying logic is the same that unwanted migrants who are
on the move towards Europe should be detained, contained and returned so that they do not become
Europe's problem.").
" AKKERMAN, supra note 27, at 3, 11 (stating that the label of refugee camp to describe Moria on
the Greek island of Lesbos "is deeply misleading more accurately Moria was a squalid, overcrowded, open air prison"). The Moria camp was built for three thousand refugees, but contained more than
thirteen thousand refugees by the time is was destroyed in a fire September 2020. See Moria Migrants: Fire Destroys Greek Camp Leaving 13,000 Without Shelter, BBC (Sept. 9, 2020), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54082201 [https://perna.cc/NU5P-XD54]; see also LOYD
MOUNTZ, supra note 14, at 4-6 (discussing various terms used for detention including noncitizen
detention, immigration detention, detention versus prison and the implications of each); Brad Adams, BangladeshTurning Refugee Camps into Open-A irPrisons, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/26/bangladesh-turning-refugee-camps-open-air-prisons# [https://
perma.cc/KZF4-59HN] (describing Bangladesh's increasing security measures at the Cox's Bazaar
refugee camp, including guards and barbed wire fences); Helena Smith,Aid Groups Condemn Greece
Over Prison'CampsforMigrants,THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2019/nov/25/aid-groups-condemn-greece-over-prison-camps-for-migrants [https://perma.cc/
9E2Q-85PK] (reporting on Greece's passage of measures to create "closed facilities" on Lesbos and
Chios that, according to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), would make the camps more like
detention centers); HUM. RTS. WATCH, "AN OPEN PRISON WITHOUT END": MYANMAR' S MASS DE-

TENTION OF ROHINGYA IN RAKHINE STATE 2-11 (2020), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
media_2020/09/myanmar1020 web.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENW2-9FLF] (describing the large securitized camps in Rakhine state at which Myanmar places internally displaced Rohingya community
members).
29
LOYD & MOUNTZ, supranote 14, at 6 ("We argue that border-enforcement and detention policies must be understood together and transnationally across onshore and offshore spaces where they
operate.").
30

PHILIPPE DE BRUYCKER, ALICE BLOOMFIELD, EVANGELIA (LILIAN) TSOURDI & JOANNA PnTIN, ODYSSEUS NETWORK, ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM DETENTION IN THE EU

21 (Jan.2015), http://odysseus-network.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/FINAL-REPORT-Alternativesto-detention-in-the-EU.pdf [https://perma.ccIH78S-SEAG]; Andrej Mahecic, UNHCR Concernedat
Detention ofAsylum-Seekers, Releases New Guidelines, UN REFUGEE AGENCY (Sept. 21, 2012),
https://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=505c3 3199&query=detention&
cf chljschl tk [https://perma.cc/EMR5-F8ZA]. This Article uses the term "unauthorized" when
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however, migrants' ability to reach their intended destinations, and has rendered migration significantly more perilous. 31
Refraining contemporary migration control from a system of externalization to a transnational system implicates, and could even centralize, the role of
the destination state. Critical accompaniment to this reconceptualization are
the levers and legal theories to hold assisting (destination) states responsible
for human rights violations perpetuated within transnational migration deterrence systems. Part I ofthis Article begins by describing the archetypical modern
transnational migration deterrence regime, namely the U.S.-Caribbean system
assembled by the United States beginning in the late 1970s. 32 It goes on to examine the development of migration deterrence mechanisms in Mexico and
Central America, highlighting the critical role the United States has played in
what is now a formidable transnational system across the region. 33
Part II of this Article turns to parallel efforts to deter migration in Europe
and Australia, again, emphasizing the central role of destination states while also
identifying the expanded use of migration detention in both regions. 34 Part III
proposes a theory of how international and regional human rights bodies can
make jurisdictional links to states that create and provide ongoing support for
transnational migration deterrence systems. 35 It does so with the objective of
rendering geographic distance irrelevant, or at least less relevant, vis-i-vis the
protection of vulnerable migrants.
I. TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION DETERRENCE IN THE AMERICAS

Scholars link modem transnational migration deterrence to the 1951 Refugee Convention. 36 When the Convention established that states must provide
migrants fleeing persecution, and present within their territory, the right to seek
asylum, destination states began instituting migration control beyond their borders. 37 One sociologist specifically identifies the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee
Convention as the catalyst for propagating transnational migration deterrence, as
the agreement expanded the 1951 Convention's scope by eliminating the defini-

describing migration or migrants who do not have permission to enter the country they are traveling to or through.
31 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 36-78 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 79-170 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 171-266 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 267-343 and accompanying text.
36

DAVID SCOTT FITzGERALD, REFUGE BEYOND REACH: HOW RICH DEMOCRACIES REPEL ASYLUM SEEKERS 21 (2019) (citing THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, ACCESS TO ASYLUM: INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND THE GLOBALISATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL 61 (2011)).
7

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
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tion of a "refugee" as someone displaced by World War II.38 Given that World
War II refugees were predominately from white European countries, the effect of
the 1967 Protocol was to apply the protections provided by the 1951 Convention
to non-white migrants. 39 Beginning about a decade later, the U.S. government's
multifaceted, prolonged, and regional approach to migration from the Caribbean
provided a blueprint for modern transnational migration deterrence.40
Section A of this Part describes the system implemented by the United
States in order to deter migration from the Caribbean in the late 1970's. 41 Section B explores systems of migration deterrence in other countries within the
Americas. 42
A. The U.S.-CaribbeanMigrationDeterrence System
The U.S. government's transnational deterrence system in response to
migration from Haiti and Cuba in the late 1970s relied on maritime interdiction, a tactic that the "United States is often credited with having pioneered." 43
An Executive Order issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 authorized the
U.S. Coast Guard to carry out these interdictions. 44 A necessary corollary to the

38 FITZGERALD, supra note 36, at 44 ("An underappreciated explanation for the increase in
remote control of asylum seekers is that it grew out of the 1967 Protocol that stripped away the
1951 Convention's geographic and temporal limitations on who is considered a refugee.").
39 Id.
4

See ALISON MOUNTZ, THE DEATH OF ASYLUM: HIDDEN GEOGRAPHIES OF THE ENFORCEMENT

ARCHIPELAGO 50 (2020) ("While many people today associate externalization with the border enforcement practices of the EU, contemporary forms of offshore enforcement can actually be traced
back to U.S. interceptions in the Caribbean that began in the late 1970s .... " (citation omitted) (first
citing Didier Bigo, When Two Become One: Internaland ExternalSecuritisationin Europe, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: POWER, SECU-

RITY AND COMMUNITY 171 (Morten Kelstrup & Michael Williams eds., 2000); then citing Christina
Boswell, The External Dimension' of EU Immigration andAsylum Policy, 79 INT'L AFFS. 619
(2003); then citing Mark Salter, Passports,Mobility, and Security:How Smart Can the BorderBe?, 5
INT'L STUD. PERSPS. 71 (2004); and then citing William Walters, Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Domopolitics, 8 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 237 (2004))).
41 See infra notes 44-75 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 73-167 and accompanying
text.
43 Leti Volpp, PushingOut and Bleeding In: On the Mobility ofBorders, in AYELET SHACHAR,
THE SHIFTING BORDER: LEGAL CARTOGRAPHIES OF MIGRATION AND MOBILITY 158, 162 (Antony

of
Simon, Peter Niesen & David Owen eds., 2020); A. Mountz & J. Loyd, TransnationalProductions
Remoteness: Building Onshore and Offshore CarceralRegimes Across Borders, 69 GEOGRAPHICA
HELVETICA 389, 389 (2014) ("These practices [of interception and offshore 'processing' of asylum
claims] began in the United States in the early 1980s in response to Haitian and Cuban migration by
sea, and became more extensively used around the globe in the 1990s and 2000s.").
44 Mountz & Loyd, supra note 43, at 394 ("President Reagan issued the offshore deterrence policy on 29 September 1981. Executive Order 12324 directed the Secretary of State to enterinto bilateral
agreements with foreign governments that would allow US Coast Guard vessels to stop, board, and
return foreignvessels." (citing Niels Frenzen, US MigrantInterdictionPracticesin Internationaland
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capture of migrants en route to the United States was the construction of a migration detention regime, both within and outside U.S. borders. 45 In this regard,
the U.S. government's efforts to deter migration from the Caribbean demonstrates how the management of transnational deterrence results in destination
states performing both acting and assisting roles. The U.S.-Caribbean system
was the first transnational deterrence regime created after the 1967 Protocol.
Subsection 1 of this Section describes the U.S. government's attempts at
creating an ad hoc migration detention system in response to increased migration from Haiti and Cuba. 46 Subsection 2 explores the expansion of this system
of migration deterrence beyond the borders of the United States. 47
1. U.S. Military Sites and the Construction of a Migration Detention System

'

An undeveloped interior migration detention system in the 1970s led to
the U.S. government's efforts to control migration from Haiti and Cuba
through military sites and the ad hoc use of jails across the country. 48 Haitians
began arriving in the United States in greater numbers in that decade after tensions mounted between Haitian migrants and citizens of the Bahamas. 49 The
Carter Administration instituted a deterrence strategy that relied on detaining
Haitian migrants in local jails.5 0 In 1978, the U.S. government began the operation of the bluntly named "Haitian Program," which mandated the detention of
Haitian migrants who could not afford bond and limited Haitians' access to
asylum.5

TerritorialWaters, in EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL 375 (Bernard Ryan & Valsamis

Mitsilegas eds., 2010))).
45 Id at 389 ("Forcible confinement is a central element of [interception] to regulate migration
both on mainland territory and offshore."); see also HARSHA WALIA, BORDER & RULE: GLOBAL MIGRATION, CAPITALISM, AND THE RISE OF RACIST NATIONALISM 45-46 (2021) ("The interdiction and

detention of Haitian refugees during the 1980s and 1990s laid the groundwork for the US onshore and
offshore immigration detention system in place today.").
46 See infra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
48 Jenna M. Loyd, CarceralCitizenship in an Age of Global Apartheid, OCCASION, Aug. 31,
2015, at 1, 11 ("Haitian asylum seekers were confined not only to Krome and the few other INS facilities that existed in the 1980s but were also routinely transferred to jails in Florida, Louisiana, Texas,
and elsewhere.").
49 Frenzen, supra note 44, at 375; Michael Craton, The BahamianSelfand the Haitian Other: The
Migrationof Haitiansto and Through the Bahamas, 1950-2000, 14 IMMIGRANTS & MINORITIES:
HIST. STUD. ETHNICITY, MIGRATION & DIASPORA 265, 265 (1995).

5 Jenna Loyd & Alison Mountz, The CaribbeanRoots of U.S. Migration Policy, 51 NACLA
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 78, 79 (2019).
51 Loyd, supra note 48, at 6-7 (describing the Program as designed by the U.S. Departments of
Justice and State with the objective of "driving out Haitians already in South Florida and discouraging
future refugees from migrating to the United States" (quoting A. Naomi Paik, CarceralQuarantineat
Guantdnamo:Legacies ofUSImprisonment ofHaitianRefugees, 1991-1994, 115 RADICAL HIST. REv.
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Overlapping with the flow of migrants leaving Haiti, the Cuban "Mariel
Boatlifts"52 brought over 125,000 migrants to the United States over a sixmonth period. 53 The Reagan Administration, as one of its first executive actions in 1981, formalized a two-part deterrence strategy that added mandatory
detention to the interdiction of migrants attempting to reach the United States
by sea.54 As with the Haitians, the U.S. government repurposed military facilities to detain Cuban migrants.55
The next year, President Reagan requested funding from the U.S. Congress for detention facilities dedicated to holding migrants. 56 The funding led
to the conversion of a former U.S. missile base, Krome (built after the 1963
U.S.-Cuban Missile Crisis) into a permanent migrant detention facility in
Southern Florida.5 7 As a base, Krome held Haitian and Cuban migrants in
tents, 58 and as a permanent detention facility, it was a key apparatus to deter
migration from the Caribbean. 59

142, 147 (2013))); see WALIA, supranote 45, at 47 (contrasting the U.S. policy of immediately detaining
"economic migrants" from Haiti with its policy of welcoming and resettling refugees from other nations).
A legal challenge to the Haitian Program forced its termination. Loyd, supra note 48, at 7.
52 "Mariel Boatlifts" was a reference to the port opened by Fidel Castro in 1980 that allowed
Cubans to leave. See Lawrence Mahoney, DeadEnd on Krome Avenue for the Haitians,There Is No
EllisIsland. TheirRoad to FreedomEnds in the Everglades., SUN-SENTINEL (Jan. 12, 1986), https://
www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1986-01-12-8601030563-story.html [https://perma.cc/RP3Z-54FA]
("On April 21, 1980, Fidel Castro opened the little port of Mariel and announced that any Cuban who
wanted to emigrate to America could go. He added, 'Good riddance, scum.' Florida was flooded with
more than 125,000 Cubans who did not fit into the model of Caribbean Socialist society.").
5 Loyd, supra note 48, at 7.
5 Loyd & Mountz, supra note 50, at 80; see also LOYD & MOUNTZ, supranote 14, at 3 (explaining how the government deployed "deterrence doctrine in the Caribbean during the Cold War, designed to prevent unwanted arrivals of asylum seekers from Haiti and Cuba" by "ma[king] mandatory
detention a central component of federal strategy and practice in the Caribbean and elsewhere");
Smita Ghosh, How MigrantDetentionBecame AmericanPolicy, WASH. POST (July 19, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/19/how-migrant-detention-became-american-policy/
[https://perma.cc/3FLR-VH4R] (detailing how the Reagan Administration's solution to a perceived
"unending Caribbean refugee problem" was to detain all arriving migrants); Claire P. Gutekunst, Interdiction of HaitianMigrants on the High Seas: A Legal andPolicy Analysis, 10 YALE J. INT'L L.
151, 157 (1984) (describing the rationale behind the mandatory detention policy).
5 Loyd & Mountz, supra note 50, at 79. The Cuban migrants were detained as they were being
processed by the U.S. government as "entrants" with "status pending," meaning that though they
"were physically present in confined settings, their presence was not yet legal." Id.
56 LOYD & MOUNTZ, supra note 14, at 87.
5 Mahoney, supra note 52; see also Alfonso Chardy, A Look Inside Krome: From Cold War
Base to ImmigrantDetentionFacility, MIA. HERALD, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
immigration/article38001279.html [https://perma.cc/5MLS-QMZM] (Oct. 11,2015) ("The only visible remnants from that tense time [the U.S.-Cuban Missile Crisis] are three diamond-shaped pads
where Nike missiles once stood, ready to thwart an attack from Cuba.").
58 THE S. POVERTY L. CTR. & AMS. FOR IMMIGRANT JUST., PRISON BY ANY OTHER NAME: A
REPORT ON SOUTH FLORIDA DETENTION FACILITIES 17 (2019), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/

default/files/cjrfla_detention report-final_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MHF-4HFY]. The former military
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At this time, the U.S. government also built Oakdale, the first migration
detention facility run jointly by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons and the thenImmigration and Naturalization Service. 60 Amongst its first detainees were
Mariel Cubans the U.S. was still attempting to repatriate. 61 Violence and abuse
were rampant in both the Krome and Oakdale facilities.62 By the early 1990s, the
U.S. government had expanded its interior migration detention capacity to nine
facilities, and contracted with private firms to operate another five facilities. 63
The expansion of interior migration detention became a significant part of
the deterrence mechanisms aimed at deterring Caribbean migrants. The U.S.
government continued, however, to pursue extraterritorial strategies. For example, it operationalized large-scale repatriations of Haitians through interdictions, by turning back those who did not pass screening interviews for asylum
conducted aboard U.S. Coast Guard vessels. 64 It also expanded its use of overseas U.S. military sites to deter migration in the Caribbean when it began to
utilize its naval base at Guantnamo Bay, Cuba. 65 The government opened the
base comprised of two tents with the capacity of two thousand one of the tents was for Haitian migrants, the other was for Cubans. Id.
59 See Loyd, supra note 48, at 7 (noting that the U.S. government detained many of the approximately twenty-five thousand Haitians fleeing by boat to seek asylum in Krome). Krome still
operates as a migrant detention facility, housing approximately six hundred beds and detains non-U.S.
citizens from all over the world. Mahoney, supra note 52.
60 Loyd & Mountz, supra note 50, at 80; Frances Frank Marcus, PrisonforAliens Opens in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/09/us/prison-for-aliens-opensin-louisiana.html [https://perma.cc/GB2L-TYND] (citing a lawyer in the lawsuit against the detention
facility's construction as asserting "that the Oakdale prison had beenbuilt as part of a Reagan Administration effort to deal with a flood of refugees from Cuba and Haiti").
61 Loyd & Mountz, supra note 50, at
80.
62 See Chardy, supra note 57 (stating that during the 1980s and 1990s, there were
"almost routine" reports of beatings and rapes of detainees held at the Krome facility); LOYD & MOUNTZ, supra
note 14, at 80 (detailing the riots in both Krome and Oakdale).
63 Loyd & Mountz, supra note 50, at
80.
64 Harold Hongju Koh, America's Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 139, 142-43
(1994). ("[U.S. immigration officers] with little knowledge of political conditions inHaiti conducted
'credible fear' interviews generally lasting no more than five minutes aboard Coast Guard cutters,
under conditions of little or no privacy." (citing Lowerstein Int'l Hum. Rts. Clinic, Aliens andDuty of
Nonrefoulment: Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 2 n.4 (1993))). The
Haitian Refugee Center and individual Haitian refugees in 1991 filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida to stop this practice based on the First Amendment right of
association and right to counsel and the right of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the 1967 U.N.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The district court issued injunctions twice, and both times
the Eleventh Circuit overturned the decision. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, No. 91-2653, 1991
WL 330942 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1991); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D.
Fla.), remanded, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 954 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1992).
65 Professor Harold Koh describes the offshore detention of Haitians and Cubans in the 1990s as
containing three unique features: (1) As part of a deliberate "buffer zone" strategy to impede refugees
from reaching the U.S.; (2) Indefinite detention without opportunity to bring individual claims of
asylum; and (3) The U.S. government's claim that offshore detention sites are "rights-free zones," i.e.,
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base as a migration detention site in response to a new wave of refugees fleeing Haiti after the 1991 coup of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.6 6 Within its
first eighteen months of operation, the U.S. government detained over thirtysix thousand Haitians at Guantinamo.67 It was also a key site after the implementation of the Clinton Administration's "wet foot, dry foot" policy,68 which
allowed Cuban migrants who reached U.S. land to stay and petition for permanent residency status but subjected Cubans intercepted at sea to detention and
repatriation. 69
2. Transnational Migration Detention in the Caribbean
As detailed above, the U.S.-Caribbean transnational migration deterrence
effort relied on the creation of a "maritime buffer" authorized by the Reagan
Administration via migrant interceptions by the U.S. Coast Guard. 70 The subsequent Bush and Clinton Administrations expanded the coupling of interdictions with offshore detention, capitalizing on the presence of U.S. military bases across the Caribbean to design atransnational migration system.7' The use
"where refugees lack any legal rights cognizable under U.S. law and American citizens lack First
Amendment rights to communicate with them." Koh, supra note 64, at 140-41 (first citing Gerald L.
Neuman, Buffer ZonesAgainstRefugees: Dublin, Schengen, andthe GermanAsylum Amendment, 33

VA. J. INT'L L. 503 (1993); then citing Cuban Am. Bar Ass'nv. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir.
1995); then citing Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991); and then citing
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992)).
66 WALIA, supra note 45, at 48.
67 Koh, supra note 64, at 143.
68 LOYD & MOUNTZ, supra note 14, at 160-6 1. The policy was in response to another
wave of
migration from Cuba. Id. In July 1994, Castro proclaimed that Cubans were free to leave the
country, prompting approximately thirty thousand Cubans to embark on boats to the United
States. Loyd, supra note 48, at 10; see also Geoffrey Heeren, DistancingRefugees, 97 DENV. L. REV.
761, 774 (2020) ("In 1994, a wave of Cuban asylum seekers set out forFlorida, and U.S. Coast Guard
cutters intercepted and delivered about 32,000 Cubans to Guantanamo Bay." (citing SERGIO CARRERA
ET AL., OPEN SOC'Y EUR. POL'Y INST., OFFSHORING ASYLUM AND MIGRATION IN AUSTRALIA,
SPAIN, TUNISIA AND THE US: LESSONS LEARNED AND FEASIBILITY FOR THE EU 38 (2018), https://

www. ceps. eu/ceps-publications/offshoring-asylum-and-migration-australia-spain-tunisia-and-us/
[https://perma.cc/4JXX-5GSQ])).
69
LOYD & MOUNTZ, supra note 14, at 160-61; Lupe S. Salinas, Lawless Cops, Latino Injustice,
andRevictimization by the Justice System, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1095, 1121; Aaron Klein & Jake
E. Marcus, United States-CubaNormalizedRelations andthe MLB Influence: The BaseballCoalition
Committee, 47 U. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 258, 277-78 (2016). The policy represented both declining
public support for Cuban migration to the United States and public objection to the disparate favorable
treatment of Cuban migrants vis-a-vis Haitian migrants. Heather M. Kolinsky, A Fine Line, Redefined:
Moving TowardMore EquitableAsylum Policies, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 649, 675 n.172 (2011).
70 See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
71 Mountz & Loyd, supra note 43, at 394. In the mid-1990s, "approximately
forty thousand
people were held on U.S. military bases in the Panama Canal Zone, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Turks and Caicos." MOUNTZ, supra note 40, at 42 (first citing Koh, supra note
64; and then citing Michael J. McBride, Migrants andAsylum Seekers: PolicyResponses in the Unit-
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of its own coast guard and military bases meant that the United States initially
functioned as an acting state, albeit extraterritorially.
The U.S. government eventually expanded its extraterritorial reach to deter migrants in the Caribbean beyond actors and geographic sites under its control. 72 In doing so, the U.S.-Caribbean system relied on the now prevalent
transnational practice of enlisting states in the region to participate in the deterrence of migrants destined for the United States. 73 These arrangements included agreements with sending states to repatriate their nationals, namely the intermittent agreements the United States made with Haiti and Cuba. 74 The U.S.
government also created agreements with Caribbean states under the
"Safehaven plan" to detain Haitian and Cuban migrants intercepted at sea,7 5 in
response to overcrowding at its military bases in the late 1980s. 76 In the mid1990s, the U.S. government expanded extraterritorial migration detention arrangements with Caribbean island states after public criticism ofthe U.S. government's policy of involuntarily returning migrants to Haiti. 77 The U.S. government did not, however, permit migrants who it placed in safe haven camps
to apply for resettlement in the United States, which meant that if they wanted
to seek asylum they would have to return to the places from which they fled
persecution and attempt to re-enter the United States. 78
B. MigrationDeterrenceAcross the Americas
While the U.S. government operated a transnational system aimed at deterring Haitian and Cuban migration, it also was securitizing its southern land

ed States to ImmigrantsandRefugeesfrom CentralAmericaand the Caribbean,37 INT'L MIGRATION

289 (2002)).
72 See LOYD & MOUNTZ, supra note 14, at 160 ("Far from being a project that
the United States
could accomplish alone, the Clinton administration had to work to create bilateral arrangements with
countries in the [Caribbean].").
73 Loyd & Mountz, supra note 50, at 82; LOYD & MOUNTZ, supra note 14, at 160. The U.S. government's transnational efforts even went beyond Caribbean states. See Heeren, supranote 68, at 772
(noting that after the 1991 coup in Haiti, the U.S. "sought to negotiate agreements with Belize, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela to house refugees with credible claims" (citing RUTH
ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RSCH.

SERV., RS21349,

U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ONHAITIANMIGRANTS 4

(2011))).
74 Mountz & Loyd, supra note 43, at 394-95.
75 LOYD & MOUNTZ, supra note 14, at 160.
76 Jenna M. Loyd, Emily Mitchell-Eaton & Alison Mountz, The Militarization of Islands and
Migration: TracingHuman Mobility Through US Bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 53 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 65, 71 (2016) (noting that the U.S. government began constructing camps in Antigua,
Dominica, St. Lucia, Suriname, and the Turks and Caicos).
77

MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., I92047, CARIBBEAN-U.S. RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR

CONGRESS 11 (1994).
78 Koh, supra note 64, at 153-54.
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border. 79 By the late 1980s, due largely to political unrest exacerbated by U.S.
interference in Central America, there was a spike in the number of asylum
seekers arriving atthe U.S. southern border. 80 The U.S. government's response
relied heavily on detention: the policy instituted was to make preliminary asylum determinations within twenty-four hours, mandating the detention of migrants who did not pass this screening.8 ' This response, along with the policies
aimed to deter U.S.-Caribbean migration, morphed immigrant detention in the
United States from a "modest system"8 2 to the largest detention system in the
world. 83 There has been a clear racial and regional component to this expansion of detention,84 including the fact that the majority of those detained in the
United States have been people of color from Central America.8 5
79 In the context of migration policies, "securitization" is "a term that denotes the confluence of
immigration policy with national security concerns and antiterrorism measures .... " Cecilia Menjivar, ImmigrationLaw Beyond Borders:ExternalizingandInternalizingBorderControlsin an Eraof
Securitization, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353, 354 (2014) (first citing Avi Astor, Unauthorized
Immigration, Securitizationand the Making of Operation Wetback, 7 LATINO STUD. 5 (2009); then
citing Didier Bigo, Security Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease, 27
ALTERNATIVES 63 (2002); and then citing MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND
THE EXPANDING I.N.S. JAIL COMPLEX (2002)); see also FITZGERALD, supra note 36, at 42 (defining

securitization as "interpreting reality and creating policy through the master frame of protecting
against violent threats to the state").
80 See Heeren, supra note 68, at 770 (describing the Mexican border as "inundated with Central
American asylum applicants" (citing David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigatingthe Coast ofBohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (1990))).
" Id. ("The approval rates in the 1980s for Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applicants were
consistently around 1-3%. In comparison, the approval rates in the 1980s for applications from the
USSR was 72.6%." (first citing Deborah Anker, US. Immigration andAsylum Policy: A BriefHistorical Perspective, 13 DEF. ALIEN 74, 81 (1990); and then citing id. at 80)).
8 Emily Kassie, Detained:How the U. S. Built the World's LargestImmigrantDetention System,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/24/detained-uslargest-immigrant-detention-trump [https://perma.cc/T4RU-CFNQ] ("A modest system holding fewer
than 3,000 migrants a day at the end of the 1970s, detention has now morphed into a sprawling machinery ensnaring immigrants across the [United States].").
83 Id.; see also MOUNTZ, supra note 40, at 129 ("The United States today holds the largest population of detainees and the most expansive landscape of detention onshore with the greatest reach
offshore."); Lora Adams, State andLocal Governments Opt Out ofImmigrantDetention, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (July 25, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2019/
07/25/472535/state-local-governments-opt-immigrant-detention/ [https://perma.cc/3HLJ-6SU3] ("The
number of immigrants detained in the United States has increased nearly every year for 25 years,
ballooning from roughly 6,700 people in 1994 to nearly 53,000 [in July 2019].").
8 See Hindpal Singh Bhui, The Placeof Race' in UnderstandingImmigration Control and the
Detention ofForeignNationals, 16 CRIMINOLOGY& CRIM. JUST. 267,269 (2016) (arguing that modern detention practices in the United States should be understood through a lens of historical racism).
85 Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, PresidentialIdeology andImmigrant Detention, 69 DUKE
L.J. 1855, 1857 n.5 (2020) ("Detentions of individuals from Mexico and the 'Northern Triangle'
countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras constituted 83% of the total [detainees in fiscal
year 2017]." (citation omitted)); Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, DetainingFamilies:A
Study ofAsylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 830 (2018) (stating that
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Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.S. government began enhancing its
funding for border enforcement, particularly for border patrol agents across the
Southwest U.S. border,8 6 facilitating the apprehension of a greater number of
migrants. This aspect ofthe U.S. internal border securitization efforts, relative
to the expanded use of detention, yielded equally significant results over the
course of the next two decades: by 2012, there were five times the number of
border agents as there were in 1993.87
The securitization of the U.S.-Mexico border was also atransnational effort, as it included enhancing Mexico's capacity to deter migrants from crossing the U.S. border. Today, Mexico's migration control system has developed
into what has been described as "the Mexican Transit Control Regime." 88 In
2001, priorto the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States and Mexico signed a
bilateral agreement that constituted the Mexican government's "commitment
to Washington to reduce the flow of undocumented migrants arriving at the
joint border." 89 The post-9/11 era witnessed a massive militarization of Mexico's migration control system, supported by significant financial and technical
support by the United States. Over a decade after 9/11, a U.S. federal government official described the Guatemala-Mexico border as the new U.S. southern

despite the number of single migrants from the Northern Triangle only doubling from 2001-2016, the
number of Northern Triangle migrants in family detention increased by thirteen times).
86 Christine Kovic & Patty Kelly, MigrantBodiesas Targets ofSecurity Policies: CentralAmericans CrossingMexico's Vertical Border, 41 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 3-4 (2017) ("The

budget of the U.S. Customs and BorderPatrol nearly tripled from 1993 to 2000 with significant funding going toward border enforcement in the US southwest." (footnote omitted)).
87
Id. at 4 ("Withthe approval of the 2012 Department of Homeland Security Appropriation Bill,
there are five times as many borderpatrol agents in place as there were in 1993." (citing UnitedStates
BorderPatrol:BorderPatrolAgentNationwideStaffing by FiscalYear, U.S. BORDERPATROL, https://
www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Jan/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20
Year%20Staffing%20Statistics%20%28FY%201992%20-%20FY%202019%29_0.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4ZCS-AYS8]). The funding was in conjunction with the launch of Operation Hold the Line in
September 1993, with the objective of "restor[ing] the rule of law to the US-Mexico border." Id. at 3
(quoting Alan Bersin, Assistant Sec'y of Int'l Affs., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
88 Amalia Campos-Delgado, AbnormalBordering:Control, PunishmentandDeterrencein Mexico 's MigrantDetention Centres, 61 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 476, 480 (2020).
89 Id. at 481 (citing Juan Manuel Sandoval Palacios, Los Efuerzos Antiinmigrantes EstadounidensesSe Regionalizan alNorte y al Sur de ContinenteAmericano [Anti-American Immigration Efforts Regionalize North and South America], in UNESCO, DERECHOS HUMANOS Y FLUJOS
MIGRATORIOS EN LAS FRONTERAS DE MEXICO [HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATORY FLOWS AT THE

BORDER OF MEXICO] 95 (2003), htps://www.casede.org/BibliotecaCasede/migracionydh.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NSU8-A3XM]). The agreement, the Plan of Action for Cooperation and Border Safety, was
signed on June 22, 2001. Id This agreement is also known as "Plan Sur." LUIS ALFREDO ARRIOLA
VEGA, MEX. CTR., POLICY ADRIFT: MEXICO'S SOUTHERN BORDER PROGRAM 7 (2017), https://

scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/97772/MEX-pub-FronteraSur-062317.pdf~sequence=1&
isAllowed-y [https://perma.cc/NS5V-W8Z5].
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border.90 The Trump Administration significantly enhanced border deterrence
policies executed by Mexico, and threatened to raise U.S. tariffs on Mexican
goods if the government did not stop migrants from entering the United
States. 91 The previous U.S. Administration also extended transnational migration deterrence efforts to the Northern Triangle states, using similarly coercive
tactics to execute agreements to return asylum seekers to the region. 92
Subsection 1 details the growth of Mexico's migration control system and
the critical role ofthe U.S. government in this growth. 93 Subsection 2 describes
the conditions of Mexico's detention system. 94 Subsection 3 discusses migration deterrence efforts in other Northern Triangle countries. 95
1. Mexico's Migration Deterrence System
The growth of the migration control capacity along Mexico's southern
border has been a phenomenon of transnational migration deterrence in the
Americas that has received comparatively less attention than the heightening
of immigration enforcement along the U.S. southern border.96 Packaged as security policies that aim to curtail criminal activities, such as the trafficking of
arms, drugs, and humans, a focus on migration control efforts along the Mexican southern border began in 1998 with "Operation Seal the Border." 97 Initially, the operation was funded by the Mexican government and the U.S. government's role was limited to information sharing.98 A few years later, however, the United States provided considerable, direct support--namely $11 million in funding--to bolster Mexico's next major security policy: the Southern
Plan (Plan Sur)99 Implemented in July 2001, the Southern Plan included: en90 Kovic & Kelly, supra note 86, at 1, 3 ("The Guatemalan border with Chiapas is now
our southemborder." (quoting Alan Bersin, Assistant Sec'y of Int'l Affs., Dep't Homeland Sec.)).
91 Makini Brice, Trump Threatens More Tariffs on Mexico Over PartofImmigration Deal, REUTERS, June 10, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-mexico/trump-threatens-more-tariffson-mexico-over-part-of-immigration-deal-idUSKCN1TB182 [https://perna.cc/7AN8-GMKT].
92 See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
93 See infra notes 96-121 and accompanying text.
94 See infra notes 122-149 and accompanying text.
95 See infra notes 149-170 and accompanying text.
96 VEGA, supra note 89, at 5 ("The attention given to [Mexico's] southern border is a rather recent development, especially when compared with the focus paid to its counterpart in the north.").

97

OMAR ARAIZA, HOLLY BUTTREY, VICTORIA RossI & SARAH SPALDING, POL'Y RSCH. PROJECT, CENTRAL AMERICA & MEXICO POLICY INITIATIVE: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND LEGACY OF

MEXICO'S SOUTHERN BORDER PROGRAM 3 (2019), https://www.strausscenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/prp_208 theimplementationand legacy of mexicos_southern border_program_2019.pdf
[https://penna.cc/J99J-W7CV].
98
Id. at 7.
99 Id. at 8-9; see also VEGA, supra note 89, at 5 ("Mexican authorities began to launch policy
instruments for the southern region in the late 1990s. Coincidentally or not, at that time security concerns also mounted in the United States and led to an increase in U.S. deportations due to the imple-
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hancing checkpoints and the presence of migration control officers, including
Mexican soldiers and police, along Mexico's southern border; adding migration
control to the Mexico-Guatemala border; and increasing maritime patrolling.0 0
The Merida Initiative, which Mexico began to implement in 2008, represented "a new level" of U.S. support provided to Mexico's capacity for migration control.' 0' The U.S. and Mexican governments presented the Merida Initiative as a "security cooperation package," 0 2 and through it the U.S. government has provided millions of dollars1 03 of migration control equipment, including helicopters, surveillance aircraft, and canine units, as well as technical
assistance to Mexico and throughout Central America. 0 4 Migration detention
began to expand substantially, with the number of facilities doubling, particularly in the southern part of Mexico.1 05
The U.S. and Mexican governments broadened the scope of the Merida
Initiative in 2011 by prioritizing Mexican institution building, including the

mentation of tougher immigration regulations, particularly the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996." (first citing Jaqueline Hagan, Karl Eschbach & Nestor Rodriguez,
U.S. DeportationPolicy, FamilySeparation,and Circular Migration, 42 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 64
(2008); and then citing Nestor Rodriguez & Jacqueline Maria Hagan, FracturedFamilies and Communities: Effects of Immigration Reform in Texas, Mexico, and El Salvador, 2 LATINO STUD. 328
(2004))).
' ARAIZA ET AL., supra note 97, at 9.
0 Id. at 16; Kovic & Kelly, supra note 86, at 4.
102 Kovic & Kelly, supra note 86, at 4. The Mdrida Initiative began appropriatingfunds in 2008,
and is part of the "Security and Prosperity Partnership" (SPP) billed as "providing security aid to
'counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and border security measures."' Id. The SPP of North America
was a trilateral initiative amongst Canada, Mexico, and the United States between 2005 and 2008. One
of SPP's issues was border security, albeit related to goods not people, as its focus was to balance post
9/11 heightened security measures with efficient movement of cargo across borders. M. ANGELES
VILLARREAL & JENNIFER E. LAKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22701, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY
PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES 7-8 (2009); see also
CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10578, MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF THE MERIDA INI-

TIATIVE, 2007-2021, at 1 (2021) (noting that the Merida Initiative emphasized the idea of "shared
responsibility").
103 Edward Hunt, The U S. Has Spent Billions Trying to Fix Mexico 's Drug War. It's Not Working., WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/15/us-hasspent-billions-trying-fix-mexicos-drug-war-its-not-working/ [https://perma.cc/QNQ8-2ESM]; Thomas
A. Shannon, Assistant Sec'y of State, Remarks onU.S. Policy for the Americas (Apr. 2, 2008) (transcript available at https://www.as-coa.org/articles/us-asst-secretary-state-westem-hemisphere-affairsthomas-shannon [https://perma.cc/9TXR-B7KE]).
104 Kovic & Kelly, supra note 86 at 4.
105 VEGA, supra note 89, at 6 ("During the 1990s, Mexico had 25 migrant detention centers;
the
following decade, twice as many had emerged, most of them located in the southern part of the country." (citing Rodolfo Casillas R., Entre Ia Politica Deseada, la Practica y los Flujos Migratorios
Emergentes: Repuestas en Construcci6n y Desafios Duraderos (Migraci6n en Tnrnsito, Working
Paper No. 4, 2016))).
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creation of a "21st-Century [U.S.-Mexico] Border." 0 6 Despite Mexico's migration securitization efforts, a combination of social, political, environmental,
and economic factors contributed to continual migration out of Central America, through Mexico, and into the United States. 0 7 By 2014, with an unprecedented number of unaccompanied minors migrating into the United States
from the region, 0 8 the U.S. government declared the migration flow a humanitarian crisis. 09 The Obama Administration approached then-Mexican President
Enrique Pena Nieto and leaders from other Central American states about
working together to "stem the flow of migrants" from the region." 0 About a
month later, Mexico announced the Southern Border Plan (Plan Frontera Sur
or PFS). I Through the PFS, Mexico's migration enforcement efforts included
opening internal checkpoints and closing migration routes," 2 conducting raids
along Mexico's southern border, "13 and cracking down on the operation of the
106 SEELKE, supra note 102, at 1 (emphasis omitted); see also CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41349, U.S. -MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MERIDA

INITIATIVE AND BEYOND 19-21 (2017) (discussing the "21 st-Century Border" pillar of the Mdrida
Initiative).
107 Paul J. Angelo, Why CentralAmerican MigrantsAre Arriving at the U S. Border, COUNCIL
ONFOREIGNRELS. (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/why-central-american-migrants-arearriving-us-border [https://perma.cc/U93K-X9PA]. See generallyRagini Shah, No Matter What: The
InevitabilityofMexican-US. Migration, andIts Lessonsfor Border ControlStrategies,55 WAYNE L.
REV. 1851, 1852 (2009) ("[S]tudies make clear that the massive increases in spending and personnel
to secure the border and increase interior enforcement have not had any appreciable effect on the
number of people entering the United States without authorization.").
108 Katharine M. Donato & Blake Sisk, Children'sMigrationto the UnitedStatesfrom Mexico
and CentralAmerica:Evidence from the Mexican andLatin American MigrationProjects, J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 58,59 (2015);DAN RESTREPO & ANN GARCIA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE
SURGE OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN FROM CENTRAL AMERICA: ROOT CAUSES AND POLICY SO-

LUTIONS (2014), https://americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CentAmerChildren3.pdf?_
ga=2.8065842.1611522648.1648404614-523856764.1648227168 [https://perma.cc/2SD2-B7HA].
109 ARAIZA ET AL., supra note 97, at 12 (noting that President Barack Obama declared the migration of Central American unaccompanied minors an "urgent humanitarian situation" (citing Press
Release, The White House, Off. of the Press Sec'y, Presidential Memorandum Response to the Influx of Unaccompanied Alien Children Across the Southwest Border (June 2, 2014), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/02/presidential-memorandum-response-influxunaccompanied-alien-children-acr [https://perma.cc/T4DH-THH8])).
110 Id. (quoting Press Release, The White House, Off. of the Press Sec'y, Letter from the President Efforts to Address the Humanitarian Situation in the Rio Grande Valley Areas of Our Nation's
Southwest Border (June 30, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/
30/letter-president-efforts-address-humanitarian-situation-rio-grande-valle [https://perma.cc/GH2ZPDDA]).
" Id.
112 Victoria Rietig & Rodrigo Dominguez Villegas, Changing Landscape Prompts Mexico 's
Emergence as a Migration Manager, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.

migrationpolicy.org/article/changing-landscape-prompts-mexicos-emergence-migration-manager
[https://perma.cc/P88S-TXT5].
113
Id. ; see also Noquel A. Matos, Rectifying a Wrongful Reaction: PolicyAlternatives to Family
Detention andExpeditedMigrationProceedingsWithoutRepresentationfor UnaccompaniedMinors

2022]

TransnationalMigrationDeterrence

13 15

infamous "La Bestia," a dangerous network that includes freight trains migrants use to travel through Central America into Mexico." 4 By 2018, the
United States spent over "$100 million in equipment and training" for the
Mexican military to fortify the border." 5
One year after PFS went into effect, the rate of migrants apprehended by
Mexican authorities skyrocketed."1 6 Some scholars have described Mexico's
role as one of a "migration manager" for the United States." 7 Mexico has conducted migration control management, however, while committing serious
human rights violations. Advocates, when documenting the treatment of migrants in Mexico after the implementation of PFS, found that migrants were
"frequently victims of kidnappings and ransom demands, human trafficking,
sexual assault, robbery, and even murder."I8 Mexican local and federal gov-

and OtherMigrants Seeking Asylum, 23 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 215,217 (2016) (describing Mexico's increased patrols of shelter cities).
114 Matos, supra note 113, at 217; see also Jeremy Doran, America's Second
Southern Border?
Mexico's 2014 Programa FronteraSur and the Widening of North American Immigration Cooperation 8 (2019) (PhD. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin) (on file with the University of Texas
Libraries, University of Texas at Austin) (detailing President Pena Nieto's intentions to "silence[] the
beast"); Rietig & Dominguez Villegas, supra note 112 (describing Mexico's efforts to curb the use of
"La Bestia" as a vehicle for stowaway migrants to reach the border).
115 ARAIZA ET AL., supra note 97, at 16. Although the exact amount of U.S. dollars that goes into
supporting the PFS is unknown, there is evidence that the U.S. has provided considerable funding. Id.
(noting that one day after then-Mexican President Pena Nieto announced PFS, "the Obama Administration requested emergency supplemental appropriations from the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations," and that the State Department told the Appropriations Committee that "the United
States was poised to support the Southern Border Program through []$86 million dollars in funds").
The U.S. also likely provides funding for PFS informally through the Mdrida Initiative. Id; see also
Doran, supra note 114, at 9 ("There is considerable evidence that much of [PFS'] funding comes from
the United States by way of the Mdrida Initiative .... "); Rietig & Dominguez Villegas, supra note
112 ("Partly funded by the Merida initiative, the interior checkpoints are modeled on the San Ysidro
port of entry in San Diego, California and equipped with gamma ray detectors to inspect shipping
containers and carriers, infrared sensors, police dogs, customs and military personnel, and immigration agents.").
116
Doran, supra note 114, at 9 (citing CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 1F10215,
MEXICO'S RECENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS (2015)). Some say this deterrence is the

program's explicit goal. See Kovic & Kelly, supra note 86, at 5 ("The Southern Plan is supported by
the USA with the explicit goal of detaining Central American migrants before they reach the USA.").
117 Rietig & Dominguez Villegas, supra note 112; VEGA, supra
note 89, at 6.

8
" Maureen Meyer, Migrantsin Transit Face Crimes andHuman Rights Abuses, WASH. OFF. ON
LATIN AM. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.wola.org/analysis/migrants-transit-face-crimes-human-rightsabuses-mexican-government-prioritizes-detention-deportation-protection/ [https://perma.cc/SEK5ABTC]; see also Edson Servan-Mori et al., Migrants Suffering Violence While in Transit Through
Mexico: FactorsAssociatedwith the Decision to Continue or Turn Back, 16 J. IMMIGRANT MINORITY

HEALTH 53, 53 (2014) ("Stigmatization, discrimination, human rights violations and violence are
constant problems that [undocumented] migrants [in Mexico] face." (first citing Cdsar Infante et al.,
Violence CommittedAgainstMigrants in Transit: Experiences on the Northern Mexican Border, 14 J.
IMMIGRANT MINORITY HEALTH 449 (2012); and then citing Cesar Infante, Peter Aggleton & Pat
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ernment agents, including immigration enforcement agents, were perpetrators
of or otherwise complicit in crimes against migrants. 119 Impunity for crimes
against migrants in Mexico is all but a guarantee.2 0 A significant cause of migrants' vulnerability to criminal activity was what one cultural anthropologist
calls "the violence oftransit," 2 1 namely more perilous migration routes necessary to circumvent Mexico's heightened security regime. Mexico's migration
detention practices-a growing component of this security system-has been
another significant source of human rights abuses against migrants.
2. Migration Detention in Mexico
The securitization of Mexico's migration control regime, achieved with
the substantial funding the U.S. government provided, has led Mexico to now
have one of the largest immigration detention systems in the world. 2 2 One
scholar has characterized Mexico's migration detention practices as "an externalization of U.S. border control."1 23 Details about the conditions in Mexico's
migrant carceral system are difficult to obtain, as the government operations of

Pridmore, Forms and Determinantsof Migration andHIV/AIDS-Related Stigma on the MexicanGuatemalan Border, 19 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RSCH. 1656 (2009))).
119 Meyer, supra note 118; see also World Report 2015: Mexico: Events of 2014, HUM. RTS.

WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/mexico [https://perma.cc/S8B5TQMQ] (citing "complicity of prosecutors and public defenders" as a factor in the Mexican criminal
system's failure to provide justice for victims).
12

See XIMENA SUAREZ, ANDRES DIAZ, JOSt KNIPPEN & MAUREEN MEYER, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR MIGRANTS IN MEXICO: A RIGHT THAT EXISTS ONLY ON THE BOOKS 4 (2017), https://www.

kinoborderinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Access-to-Justice-for-MigrantsJuly-2017.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QT25-9JB3] (reporting that, between 2014-2016, 99% of the crimes committed
against migrants did not yield criminal sentences or punishments for the alleged perpetrators).
121 Wendy Vogt, The War on Drugslsa War on Migrants: CentralAmericansNavigate the Perilous Journey North, 3 LANDSCAPES VIOLENCE, no. 1, 2015, at 1, 3.

122 According to the Global Detention Project, in 2019, Mexico detained more than 182,940 migrants, the highest number recorded in Mexico. In 2018, 131,445 persons were detained. GLOB. DET.
PROJECT, COUNTRY REPORT: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN MEXICO 27 (2021), https://www.global

detentionproject.org/immigration-detention-in-mexico-between-the-united-states-and-central-america
[httsp://perma.cc/642P-GNK8] [hereinafter GDP MEXICO REPORT]; see also Campos-Delgado, supra
note 88, at 482 (describing the "mushrooming" of detention facilities in Mexico). Mexico had also
reportedly planned to stop detaining children after 2015; however, in 2019, Mexico still detained more
than fifty thousand children. GDP MEXICO REPORT, supra, at 8; see Kevin Sieff, Mexico Is Holding
Hundreds of Unaccompanied ChildrenDetainedBefore They Reach the U.S. Border, WASH. POST

(Mar. 13, 2021), hittps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexico-us-border-unaccompaniedchildren/2021/03/12/76155c10-829d-1leb-9ca6-54e187ee4939_story.htil [https://perma.cc/QAB693X7].
123 Campos-Delgado, supra note 88, at 476.
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the facilities lack transparency. 2 4 The conditions of Mexico's detention centers
that have been disclosed tell of serious and systemic human rights violations.
Scholars describe the daily operation of Mexico's migration detention facilities as seemingly "held together with pins: overcrowded facilities, unsanitary conditions, scarcity of material recourses and strategies of control, [and]
discipline and punishment that rely on the discretionary powers of overworked
personnel." 25 Despite being off-limits to the public, including journalists, details have emerged about the conditions one of Mexico's detention centers, the
Siglo XXI detention facility located in the city of Tapachula near the MexicoGuatemala border.126 Siglo XXI, which means "twenty-first century" in Spanish, is the largest migration detention facility in Latin America. 2 7 Described as
"a prisonlike compound,"1 28 migrants at Siglo XXI have endured medical neglect 29 that, in some instances, has resulted in death.1 30 Staff are abusive to
detainees,131 and there is severe overcrowding.1 32 The deplorable conditions of
Siglo XXI have even deterred migrants from pursuing asylum claims. 133 A
journalist detained at the facility as a result of a visa issue when she tried to
leave Mexico linked Siglo XXI to the broader history of U.S. financial and
material support of the state's migration control system.1 34 She observed that
"operations at the detention facility are pretty much an exact example of the
US telling Mexico what to do."135
The Trump Administration's Migrant Protection Protocol (MPP),1 36 which
mandated that migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border seeking asylum stay in
124
Id. at 486; BelenFernandez, Siglo XXI: My 24 Hours in Mexico's 21st-Century MigrantPrison, AL JAZEERA (July 22, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/7/22/siglo-xxi-my-24hours-in-mexicos-21st-century-migrant-prison [https://perma.cc/JLW7-2828].
125 Campos-Delgado, supra note 88, at 489.
126 Associated Press, Overcrowding, Abuse Seen at Mexico Migrant Detention Center, NBC
NEWS (June 17, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/overcrowding-abuse-seen-mexicomigrant-detention-center-n1018231 [https://perma.cc/FLF7-H49J].

127 Id.

12

Id.

129 Alex Harrison-Cripps, Mexico's Hidden Barriers to Asylum Seekers a
Successful Deterrent,

MEX. NEWS DAILY (Mar. 25, 2020), https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/mexicos-hidden-barriers-toasylum-seekers/ [https://perma.cc/7YDS-NYYJ].
13 Campos-Delgado, supra note 88, at
476.
31 Harrison-Cripps, supra note 129.
132 Associated Press, supra note 126.
133 Harrison-Cripps, supra note 129. In2019, Mexico deported 99.8% of migrants detained. GDP
MEXICO REPORT, supra note 122, at 27.
134 Fernandez, supra note 124.
135
13 6

Id.

Metering, which limited the number of asylum seekers processed by U.S. immigration agents
at U.S. -Mexico ports of entry per day, was another policy thatkept migrants in Mexico. See Fatma E.
Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. REV. 707,763-68 (2019).
The Obama Administration first used the practice of metering in response to the arrival of thousands
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Mexico until their immigration court hearing date,1 37 exemplifies the link between border deterrence and the detention, albeit ad hoc, of migrants in Mexico. MPP, also known as the "'Remain in Mexico' policy," faced legal challenges1 38 and wide criticism, 39 and yet it forced approximately seventy-one
thousand migrants to stay in Mexico during its almost thirteen months of operation. 40 Many of the migrants subjected to MPP, from Central America and
elsewhere, were compelled to wait in Mexico's dangerous border state of Tamaulipas.141 In one of its cities, Matamoros, the presence of thousands of migrants created a makeshift camp described as "a collection of ramshackle tent

of Haitian migrants in Tijuana in 2016. James Fredrick, 'Metering'at the Border, NPR (June 29,
2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/29/737268856/metering-at-the-border [https://perma.cc/HU78AKG6]; see also HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB 10295, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S REPORTED "METERING" POLICY: LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2022) (quoting the Department

of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General report, which states that U.S. immigration
officers have been regulating the entry of asylum seekers through a metering policy since 2016). Unlike MPP, however, migrants were not given a specific date and time to return to a port of entry, but
instead were told to put their names on a wait list. Fredrick, supra. Under the Trump administration,
metering became official policy in April 2018, and in mid-2019, there were around nineteen thousand
names on the wait list. Id.
137

AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE "MIGRATION PROTECTION PROTOCOLS" (2021), https://www.

americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the-migrant_protectionprotocols_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X5RH-KXWY].
138 Heeren, supra note 68, at 788 (citingInnovationL. Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503 (9th Cir.
2019) (per curiam) and Doe v. Wolf, 432 F. Supp. 3d 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2020) as examples of lawsuits
against MPP); SMITH, supra note 136 (discussing the litigation against metering); see also BENHARRINGTON & HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB 10251, "MIGRANT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS": LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO DHS' S PLAN TO REQUIRE ARRIVING ASYLUM SEEKERS TO WAIT

IN MEXICO 4-5 (2019) (arguing that the DHS does not have authority under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act to deport most of the asylum seekers coming to the border and that the policy is
unlawful because regulations were never promulgated).
139 See, e.g., Kathryn Hampton et al., Forcedinto Danger: Human Rights Violations Resulting
from the U.S. MigrantProtectionProtocols,PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://phr.

org/our-work/resourwes/forced-into-danger/ [https://perma.cc/2VZV-CW7V].
140 Lomi Kriel, The People We Left Behind: How Closing a DangerousBorder Camp Adds to
Inequities,TEX. TRIB.-PROPUBLICA INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.texastribune.

org/2021/03/18/asylum-mexico-border-migrants/?utm campaign=trib-social-buttons&utmsource=
email&utm_medium=social [https://perma.cc/2ATM-PNX8]. The Trump Administration initiated
MPP by on January 25, 2019, and the Biden Administration terminated it on February 11, 2021. Kevin
Sieff, They Missed Their US. Court Dates Because They Were Kidnapped. Now They're Blocked

from Applyingfor Asylum., WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
2021/04/24/mexico-border-migrant-asylum-mpp/ [https://perma.cc/TP4P-935K]. COVID-19 has led
to postponement of MPP hearings, exacerbating the problem. Stephen Meili,Asylum UnderAttack: Is
It Time for a ConstitutionalRight?, 26 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 147, 171 (2019-2020).
141

HUM. RTS. FIRST, ORDERS FROM ABOVE: MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION RETURN TO MEXICO POLICY 1 (2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/

default/files/hrfordersfromabove.pdf [https://perna.cc/6RXE-Q3M3] ("[T]he U.S. State Department
has designated the state of Tamaulipas a Level 4 threat risk the same warning as Afghanistan, Iraq,
Syria, Somalia, North Korea, and Yemen.").
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structures in a park abutting the Rio Grande." 42 Out of necessity, migrants
stayed in Matamoros, located directly across the border from Brownsville,
Texas.1 4 3 Its proximity to the border meant migrants could quickly access the
port of entry when they finally were called for their court hearing.1 4 4 During
one period of MPP there were up to 3,000 migrants at one time in the Matamoros camp.1 4 5 The Mexican government put up fences to close off the Matamoros camp, allegedly for the migrants' safety, and/or to cut off the encampment
from the public. 14 6 The site, now resembling more a detention center, became a
symbol of human rights violations perpetuated by MPP.1 47 Migrants forced to
stay in other parts of Mexico during MPP also faced danger and harm.1 48
The "Mexican Transit Control Regime"1 49 was built with the assistance,
and at the insistence, of the United States in response to the rise of Central
American migrants seeking asylum in the 1980s. The U.S. government's efforts to stem migration from the region also has targeted the region's sending
states directly. These efforts have taken the form of development funding initiatives and, under the Trump Administration, bilateral agreements with governments from the Northern Triangle to adjudicate asylum claims for migrants
who transited through their states.

142 Kriel, supra note 140.
14' Nicole Narea, The Abandoned Asylum Seekers on the US-Mexico Border,
VOX (Dec. 20,
2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/20/20997299/asylum-border-mexico-usiom-unhcr-usaid-migration-international-humianitarian-aid-matamoros-juarez [https://perma.cc/M2X33GRP].
144 Id.
145

Kriel, supra note 140; Laura Gottesdiener, Mexican Camp That Was Symbol ofMigrantMisery
Empties Out Under Biden, REUTERS, Mar. 7, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigrationmexico-feature/mexican-camp-that-was-symbol-of-migrant-misery-empties-out-under-biden-idUSK
BN2AZ0GB [http://perma.cc/NQ55-K2JP].
146 Kriel, supra note 140 (citing the Mexican government's statement that it fenced the camp for
the migrants' safety and to limit the growth of the camp); Valerie Gonzalez, 'Only We Know What We've
Seen': Migrants Re-enter US After Biden Lifts Remain in Mexico, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/mar/05/us-immigration-biden-remain-in-mexico-asylumseekers [https://perma.cc/7V79-G2GK] ("Fences erected by the Mexican government keep the camp
largely cut off from reporters and locals.").
147 Gottesdiener, supra note 145 ("[The] MPP program might have succeeded in obscuring the
plight of these migrants from the American public if it were not for the Matamoros camp.").
148 HUM. RTS. FIRST, supra note 141, at 5-6. Generally, MPP has caused over 1,500 reported
cases of murder, rape, and other violent assaults. Delivered to Danger: U.S. Government Sending
Asylum Seekers andMigrants to Danger (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaign/
remain-mexico [http://perma.cc/3QEB-GYZA]; HUM. RTS. FIRST, HUMAN RIGHTS FIASCO: THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S DANGEROUS ASYLUM RETURNS CONTINUE (2019), https://www.human

rightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HumanRightsFiascoDec19.pdf_[http://perma.cc/DEW7-5G3G]; see
also Nicole Hallett, Immigrant Women in the Shadow of#MeToo, 49 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 74-77
(2019) (detailing incidents of gender-based violence caused by MPP).
149 See supra note 88 and accompanying
text.
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3. The Northern Triangle and the U.S. Construction of "Protection
Elsewhere" States
The United States has similarly incentivized and coerced the Northern
Triangle states-Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador-to implement migration deterrence measures. The Central American Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI), for example, began in 2010 to address regional factors causing the
migration of unaccompanied minors to the United States. 50 Though a portion
of the funding for CARSI was designated for development projects, there was
a substantial focus on securitizing the region.' 5 ' One CARSI-funded project,
"Operation Rescue Angel," involved U.S.-trained Honduran forces intercepting buses near the Guatemalan border to search for unaccompanied minors en
route to the United States. 5 2 CARSI eventually became part of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America (the Central America strategy).1 53 The
Trump Administration would withhold humanitarian aid from the Central
America strategy to incentivize Northern Triangle states to curb migration, and
would re-release funds when it deemed that certain targets were met.
The former Administration, through a series of agreements called Border
Security Arrangements, arranged for technical and tactical support to the
Northern Triangle governments to bolster their migration control efforts. Beyond direct assistance, the Trump Administration brought these states into the
regional transnational migration deterrence system through Asylum Cooperative Agreements (ACAs). 5 5 ACAs constitute a type of "protection elsewhere"
150 Michael A. Clemens & HannahM. Postel, DeterringEmigrationwith ForeignAid: An Overview ofEvidencefrom Low-Income Countries, 44 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 667, 669 (2018).
151 See Press Release, The White House, Off. of the Press Sec'y, FACT SHEET:
United States
Support for Central American Citizen Security (May 4, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2013/05/04/fact-sheet-united-states-support-central-american-citizen-security [https://
perma.cc/67VP-YAQY] (discussing the US government's motivations for supporting CARSI).
152 Nancy Hiemstra, Pushing the US-Mexico Border South: UnitedStates'ImmigrationPolicing
Throughout the Americas, 5 INT'L J. MIGRATION & BORDER STUD. 44, 49 (2019).
153
See PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10371, U.S. STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT IN

CENTRAL AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW 1-2 (2021).
154 Id. Annual funding for the Central America strategy dropped approximately 33% during the
Trump Administration. Id. at 1. President Biden, on the other hand, is seeking to build on the program
as part of his Administration's goal of addressing the root causes of migration in the region. Id at 3.
155
See Agreement Betweenthe Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of El Salvador for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims, 85 Fed. Reg.
83,597 (Dec. 22, 2020); Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Guatemala on Cooperation Regarding the Examination of Protection
Claims, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,095 (Nov. 20, 2019); Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Honduras for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims, 85 Fed. Reg. 25,462 (May 1, 2020). The Trump Administration reportedly
sought an additional agreement with Panama, but it never materialized. See Nick Miroff, US. Seeks

Dealto SendAsylum Seekersfrom Africa andAsia to Panama, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2019), https://
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regime, as they reflect "the principle that a refugee can be denied access to
protection because they should or could access protection in another state."156
They also embody the notion of "responsibility sharing" or "burden shifting." 5 7 After the signing of the ACA with the Honduran government, thenSecretary of State Michael Pompeo tweeted: "The Honduran government's
support in confronting this crisis in the region is critical.... It is a key step in
advancing our shared, regional approach to this challenge."158
The concept of responsibility sharing can represent a utilitarian approach
to migration, as it benefits both global security and migrants.1 59 It can also be a
guise, however, for more economically and politically powerful states that are
effectively redistributing migration control to states that have minimal capacity
to protect or host migrants.1 60 The latter describes the ACA agreements between the United States and the Northern Triangle states-in fact, a U.S. Senate Democratic Staff Report found that "[t]he White House and DHS pushed
through the ACAs with bullying tactics and haste."161 One tactic used by the
www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/us-seeks-deal-to-send-asylum-seekers-from-africa-and-asiato-panama/2019/08/20/30bbde66-c37f-1 1e9-9986-1fb3e4397be4_story.html [https://perna.cc/N838BCGY] (reporting on Trump's efforts to establish an agreement with Panama).
15 6
Daniel Ghezelbash, Hyper-Legalism and Obfuscation:How States Evade Their International
ObligationsTowards Refugees, 68 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 479,496 (2020) (citing Colloquium, The Michigan Guidelines on ProtectionElsewhere, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 (2007)).
157 The term "responsibility-sharing" is preferred over the term "burden-sharing" to reflect the
responsibility that States hold to protect those seeking asylum. Savitri Taylor, The Pacific Solution or
a PacificNightmare?: The Difference Between Burden Shifting andResponsibilitySharing, ASIANPAC. L. & POL'Y J., Jan. 1, 2005, at 1, 39.
151 US. andHondurasAddress MigrationChallenges, SHAREAMERICA (Sept. 30, 2019), https://
share.america.gov/u-s-and-honduras-address-migration-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/783D-EMLF]
(emphasis omitted).
159
Kritzman-Amir & Berman, supra note 4, at 625-26. On December 10, 2018, 164 members of
the U.N. General Assembly signed the Global Compact for Regular Migration with the aim, in part, to
create greater sharing of responsibility for migration flows. Felipe A. Filomeno, Who Is Responsible
for Migrants?,THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 18, 2018), https://theconversation.com/who-is-responsiblefor-migrants-108388 [https://perma.cc/4JY8-AMU2]. The agreement has been criticized, however,
because it is not binding and does not require states to do more than what they already are doing. Lex
Rieffel, The Global Compact on Migration:Dead on Arrival?, BROOKINGS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/12/12/the-global-compact-on-migration-dead-on-arrival/
[https://perma.cc/NT6Q-P85Z].
160 See Taylor, supra note 157, at 40 (discussing as an example the Pacific Solution, which the
Australian government used to redistribute responsibility to smaller island nations in the region); see
also Achiume, supra note 8, at 1520 ("[J]ustice in immigration from the Third World to the First
World must, in important part, be a function of the distributive justice and remedial implications of
the failures of formal decolonialization.").
16 1

U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATIC STAFF, CRUELTY, COERCION, AND LEGAL CONTORTIONS: THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S UNSAFE ASYLUM COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH GUATEMALA,

HONDURAS, AND EL SALVADOR 10 (2021), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Cruelty,%

20Coercion,%2Oand%2OLegal%20Contortions%20--%20SFRC%20Democratic%20Staff%20Report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/78L2-UZXB].
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Trump Administration was to withhold development aid aimed at addressing
the root causes of migration from the region.1 62 The Report also describes an
intensification of coercive tactics by then-President Donald Trump himself
before the countries' leaders signed the respective ACAs. 63
The agreements allowed the U.S. government to remove arriving asylum
seekers to one of the Northern Triangle states, provided the asylum seeker is
not a national of the returning state. 164 The Northern Triangle ACAs technically constitute "Safe Third Country agreements,"1 65 which provide that such
agreements must give asylum seekers "access to a full and fair procedure for
determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection." 66 In a let16 2

Id. ("In March 2019, President Trump disrupted relations with Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvadorby abruptly cutting off most U.S. foreign aid to the three countries, halting over $400 million
for programs designed to address poverty, violence, and other drivers of migration to the United
States." (first citing Reuters Staff, U.S. EndingAid to El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras Over Migrants,REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-aid/u-s-endingaid-to-el-salvador-guatemala-hondums-over-migrants-idUSKCN1RB00R [https://perma.cc/V3UFEMDD]; and then citing MEYER, supra note 153)).
163 Id at 12 (detailing then-President Trump's tweet threatening to institute a "BAN" against Guatemala, "Tariffs, Remittance Fees, or all of the above." (first quoting Donald Trump (@realDonald
Trump), TWITTER (July 23, 2019), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/115364190669968
1795 [https://penna.cc/C8GG-3NR3]; and then quoting Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(July 23, 2019), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1153641907781873664 [https://perma.
cc/HCR8-HSNY]).
164 In January 2020, several Central American asylum-seekers and immigrant advocacy groups
filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of the Refugee Act, Immigration
and Nationality Act, Administrative Procedure Act, Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act of 1998,
and the Suspension Clause. Complaint at 1-13, U.T. v. Barr, No. 1:20-cv-00116 (D.D.C. Jan. 15,
2020). Among other things, the complaint alleges that the ACA countries are extremely dangerous
and unfit for asylum seekers; the ACAs are inconsistent with international law regarding safe third
country agreements; and the ACA countries are unprepared to receive asylum seekers. Id. at 2-4.
165 Susan Gzesh, "Safe ThirdCountry"Agreements with Mexico and Guatemala Would Be Unlawful, JUST SEC. (July 15, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64918/safe-third-country- agreementswith-mexico-and-guatemala-would-be-unlawful/ [http://penna.cc/TQ6Q-L3 8Z];Asylum Cooperative
Agreement Backgrounder, JUST. FOR IMMIGR., https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-workingon/asylum/asylum-cooperative-agree-ment-backgrounder/ [https://penna.cc/TL33-PDDZ].
166 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A). Canada and the United States have had a Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) that has been in effect since December 29, 2004. See Canada-US. Safe Third Country
Agreement, GOV'T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/
mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/safe-third-country-agreement.html
[https://penna.cc/8V3C-B593] (July 23, 2020). Amnesty International, the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Canadian Council of Churches, and individual claimants challenged STCA in the Federal
Court of Canada. KIRSTEN MOSEY, PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES, THE SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT IN 2021, at 1 (2021), https://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/SCTATimeline
SpotlightV3.pdf [https://perna.cc/MP76-84EE] (noting that, in 2005, the international claimants first
challenged STCA, but their case was overturned in 2008 on technical grounds). In July of 2020, the
Canadian Federal Court ruled the STCA unconstitutional. See April Yeung & Ibnat Islam, Opinion,
The Safe Third CountryAgreement Hurts Refugees. Canada Needs to Ditch It., IPOLITICS

(Mar.

5,

2021), https://ipolitics.ca/2021/03/05/the-safe-third-country-agreement-hurts-refugees-canada-needsto-ditch-it/ [https://perma.cc/BVF9-Q7J3]. The Canadian government appealed, and the Federal Court
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ter to the Trump Administration, however, twenty-one U.S. Senators wrote:
"The notion that Guatemala or the other two Northern Triangle countries offers
such a procedure strains credulity-their systems for determining asylum
claims are, at best, deeply flawed and under-resourced, and at worst, practically non-existent."1 67 Soon after taking office, the Biden Administration announced the suspension of the Northern Triangle ACAs.1 68
The transnational migration deterrence regime in the Americas represents
a system with "multidirectional" U.S. borders. 169 It is one that has transformed
the region into what has been described as "Fortress North America." 7 0 The
system is one that serves the objective of the U.S. government to deter migration across its U.S. southern border, at a great cost to the lives, safety, and
overall humane treatment of migrants.
II. TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION DETERRENCE BY EUROPEAN
STATES AND AUSTRALIA

Although the United States with the deterrence regime it developed in the
Caribbean provided the blueprint for transnational migration deterrence, the
systems created by Australia and European states are regularly cited as having
of Appeal ruled in the Canadian government's favor. See Amanda Ghahremani & Jamie Liew, Why
the Safe ThirdCountryAgreementMust Go, OPEN CAN. (June 1, 2021), https://opencanada.org/whythe-safe-third-country-agreement-must-go/ [https://penna.cc/M2ZC-H9XJ]. The STCA currently
remains in effect as the claimants appeal the Federal Court of Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court
of Canada. Id.
167 Letter from Senator Robert Menendez et al., Regarding the "Asylum Cooperative Agreements," to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo et al. 3 (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/Annex%205%20--%20Correspondence.pdf [https://penna.cc/4QL5-3 SEU]; see also HUM.
RTS. WATCH: REFUGEES INT'L, DEPORTATION WITH A LAYOVER: FAILURE OF PROTECTION UNDER

THE US-GUATEMALA ASYLUM COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT 1 (2020) (arguing that Guatemala "does
not meet the standard required in US law fora 'safe third country"' (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A)),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/05/19/deportation-layover/failure-protection-under-us-guatemalaasylum-cooperative#_ftnl [https://perma.cc/F6HG-RN3X]); GRACE FUSCOE ET AL., GEO. L. HUM.
RTS. INST., DEAD ENDS: NO PATH TO PROTECTION FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS UNDER THE GUATEMALA

ASYLUM COOPERATION AGREEMENT 12 (2020), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/human-rightsinstitute/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2020/06/Dead-Ends-Report web.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFJ3HMET] (asserting that the agreement violates U.S. law and does not protect the rights of migrants
seeking asylum as required by international law).
168 Press Statement, Antony J. Blinken, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, Suspending and Terminating the Asylum Cooperative Agreements with the Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras (Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.state.gov/suspending-and-terminating-the-asylum-coopemtiveagreements-with-the-governments-el-salvador-guatemala-and-honduras/ [https://penna.cc/4P7RTCEW].
169 See supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
17 0
Ernesto Castaneda, Michael Danielson & Jayesh Rathod, Fortress North America: Theorizing
a Regional Approach to Migration Management (2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.
academia.edu/46708197/FortressNorth_America_Theorizing_a_Regional Approach to Migration
Management [https://perma.cc/9UT5-ZUPV].
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originated bi- or multi-lateral migration control agreements. The regimes,
spanning time and geography, have in common elements such as financial and
other coercive ties between assisting and acting states, the use of migration
detention, and the prevalence of human rights violations against migrants.
Section A' 7 ' and Section B1 72 of this Part discuss transnational migration
deterrence efforts in Europe. Sections C1 73 and Section D17 4 detail Australia's
efforts to deter migration from Asia and Oceania.
A. FortressEurope's Reliance on TransnationalMigration Deterrence
Transnational migration deterrence is a prominent feature of "Fortress Europe,"1" redrawing, as one geography studies Professor writes, "[t]he map of
Europe . . [with] the restructuring of border assemblages."1 76 European states
that were formerly transit states, including Spain, Italy, Malta, and Greece,
have become final destination states, including sites where migrants'journeys
end in detention.1 77 The external border states of the EU have become effectively the region's "outpost border guards."1 78

See infra notes 175-191 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 192-223 and accompanying text.
173 See infra notes 224-236 and accompanying
text.
174 See infra notes 237-266 and accompanying
text.
175 The Dublin Regulation and the Schengen Convention, both ratified in 1990,
gave rise to the
term "Fortress Europe" to connote criticism of the region's heightened migration control. See Ashley
Binetti Armstrong, You Shall Not Pass! How the Dublin System FueledFortressEurope, 20 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 332, 336 (2020) (discussing the Dublin Regulation's connection to the term); Hassan Ould
Moctar, A BriefHistory ofFortressEurope, JADALIYYA (July 18, 2016) (presenting a history of the
policies that led to "Fortress Europe"), https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/33411 [https://perma.cc/
QSD3-ZE7J]; see also JohnReynolds, FortressEurope, GlobalMigration & The GlobalPandemic,114
AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 342, 342 (2020) ("In the EU institutional worldview, Europe mustbe 'shielded' from the threats of human mobility."); Paul Strauch, Comment, When Stopping the SmugglerMeans
171

172

Repellingthe Refugee: InternationalHuman Rights Law and the European Union's Operationto Com-

bat Smuggling in Libya 's TerritorialSea, 126 YALEL.J. 2421, 2423 (2017) ("The term 'Fortress Europe'
is now commonplace." (citing Abdullahi Elmi v. Malta, App. Nos. 25794/13 & 28151/13, ¶ 3 (Nov. 22,
2016), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/FRE#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-168780%22]} [https://perma.cc/
R3CG-6Y9K])).
176 Martina Tazzioli, Containment Through Mobility: Migrants'SpatialDisobediences and the
Reshapingof Control Through the Hotspot System, 44 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 2764, 2764
(2018).
177 MOUNTZ, supra note 40, at
69.
178 AKKERMAN, supra note 27, at 6; see also MAURIZIO ALBAHARI, CRIMES OF PEACE: MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATIONS AT THE WORLD'S DEADLIEST BORDER 15 (2015) ("The southern outposts

of immigration governance are . . . central to liberal democratic practices of national and EU selflegitimation.... They are at the heart of EU concerns over a mobile humanity that, once at sea, is
difficult to contain." (footnotes omitted)).
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Prior to the recent migration "crisis,"17 9 there was a "growing indifference
and hostility to migrants attempting to reach the EU by sea,"1 80 leading to
scores of deaths in the Mediterranean.' 8' Migration to the region began intensifying in 2011, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.18 2 With continued political
unrest in the Middle East and Africa,1 83 the year 2015 was "the deadliest year
on record for migrants" attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe.1 84 It also was the year the EU tripled its budget for migration control. 18 5
The media portrayed discord amongst member states regarding how to respond to the spike in migration to the region.18 6 There has, however, been consensus throughout the EU regarding the centrality of transnational migration
deterrence to migration control, including the expansion of maritime interdiction and using external EU states to prevent migrant mobility.1 87 Similar to the
transnational systems imposed by the United States in Mexico and Central
America, the EU systems have been predicated on a notion of "flexible sovereignty" 188-at least when it comes to the sovereignty of destination states, in-

179

The characterization of a migration "crisis" accelerated both interior and transnational migra-

tion detention in Europe. See generallyIZABELLA MAJCHER, MICHAEL FLYNN & MARIETTE GRANGE,
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: IN THE SHADOW OF THE "CRISIS" (Elwood D.

Carlson & Stuart Gietel-Basten eds., 2020) (ebook) (detailing how the label of crisis normalized the
expansion of migrant detention in the region).
180 LOYD & MOUNTZ, supra note 14, at 216.
181 Between 1993 and 2015, twenty thousand migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea.
Id. Over seven thousand of those deaths occurred in 2014 and 2015. Over 3, 770 MigrantsHave Died
Trying to Cross the Mediterraneanto Europe in 2015, UNITED NATIONS INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION
(Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.iom.int/news/over-3770-migrants-have-died-trying-cross-mediterraneaneurope-2015 [https:/perma.cc/8XUJ-U2L2].
182 Sinha, supra note 21, at 180.
183 Id.
184

Over 3,770MigrantsHave Died Trying to Cross the Mediterraneanto Europe in 2015, supra

note 181.

185 Nikolas Feith Tan & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, A TopographicalApproachto Accountabilityfor Human Rights Violations in Migration Control, 21 GERMAN L.J. 335, 335 (2020).
186 WALIA, supra note 45, at 126-27 ("News headlines frequently decry the end
of the EU. We
are told that the Schengen Agreement is breaking down with internal walls going up; core and peripheral countries are squabbling about the Dublin Regulation; technocrats are debating how to best manage migration flows; and far-right and liberal-centrist parties are divided on refugee quotas.").
187
Id at 127. This does not take into account, however, the fact that the "Brexit" movement that
ultimately led to the United Kingdom leaving the European Union was significantly driven by antiimmigrant sentiments during the period of heightened migration into the region. Amanda Garrett, Commentary, The Refugee Crisis, Brexit, and the ReframingofImmigration in Britain,EUROPENOW (Aug. 1,
2019), https://www.europenowjournal.org/2019/09/09/the-refugee-crisis-brexit-and-the-reframing-ofimmigration-in-britain/ [https://perma.cc/X563-45T9].
188
ALBAHARI, supra note 178, at 15 (describing his project as an exploration of "the geopolitical
fulcrum of a flexible sovereignty that through Frontex patrols, Eurosur surveillance, bilateral agreements, and EU border assistance missions reaches unapologetically beyond national and EU boundaries, from Tunisia to Belarus").
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cluding EU external border states and neighboring non-EU states that effectively have become migrants' final destination or place of return.
Transnational deterrence of undesirable migrants, traveling by land or by
sea, is both an established and a growing practice in Europe. A pioneering example is the readmission agreement between Spain and Morocco entered in
1992. The stated objective of the agreement was "to address the common concern of coordinating efforts to stop the illegal migration flow of foreigners"
between the two countries.1 89 The agreement, which requires Morocco to readmit migrants deported from Spain, remains in place today. 90 The SpainMorocco agreement represents a transnational arrangement that imposes "upstream securitization"I 9 '-one that sends migrants back to less-resourced
states, and thus opposite the conventional flow of migration.
B. MigrationDetention in Europe: The Presentand Future
Even before the migration "crisis" in 2015, European states sought to limit migrants' mobility. States constricted migration partially via the Dublin Regulation's requirement--forcing migrants to seek asylum in the European country that they first enter' 92 -- and through agreements with transit and neighbor189

Acuerdo Entre el Reino de Espana y el Reino de Marruecos Relativo a la Cirwulaction de Personas, el Transito y la Readmision de Extranheros Entrados Ilegalmente [Agreement Between the
Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco on the Movement of People, the Transit and the
Readmission of Foreigners Who Have Entered Illegally], B.O.E. n. 100, Feb. 13, 1992, at 13969,
translatedin FPizzutelli, The 1992 Spain-Morocco ReadmissionAgreement * in English and Spanish,
THE RTS. ANGLE (Dec. 19, 2013), https://therightsangle.wordpress.com/tag/morocco/ [https://perma.
cc/J3ZT-RR4H].
190 WALIA, supra note 45, at
108.
191 Id.; see also Olivier Clochard & Bruno Dupeyron, The Maritime Borders of Europe:
UpstreamMigratory Controls, in BORDERLANDS: COMPARING BORDER SECURITY IN NORTH AMERICA
AND EUROPE 19, 19 (Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly ed., 2007) (describing the concept as the EU "impos[ing] cooperation on peripheral states in order to limit immigration overflows").
192 Jan-Paul Brekke & Grete Brochmann, Stuck in Transit: SecondaryMigrationofAsylum Seekers in Europe, NationalDifference, andthe DublinRegulation, 28 J. REFUGEE STUD. 145, 146 (2014).
The 1990 Dublin Convention created the DublinRegulation withthe goal of preventing migrants from
seeking asylum in multiple EU states. Maryellen Fullerton, Asylum Crisis ItalianStyle: The Dublin
Regulation Collides with European Human Rights Law, 29 HARv. HUM. RTS. L.J. 57, 66 (2016).
There are considerable concerns with the Dublin Regulations related to its effect on international
human rights protections for migrants. See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, Harmonizingfor Whom? The
DevaluationofRefugee Protectionin the Era of EuropeanEconomicIntegration, 26 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 719, 726 (1993) ("Because there is no procedural or substantive harmonization of affirmative
norms of refugee law in Europe, recognition rates for persons with comparable claims differ quite
significantly from country to county." (first citing AMNESTY INT'L, EUROPE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE NEED FOR A FAIR ASYLUM POLICY 12-15 (1991); then citing KAY HAILBRONNER, MOGLICHKEITEN UND GRENZEN EINER EUROPAISCHEN KOORDINIERUNG DES EINREISE-UND ASYLRECHTS
[POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF EUROPEAN COORDINATION OF ENTRY AND ASYLUM LAW] 126
(1989); and then citing UNHCR Positionon ConventionsRecently Concluded in Europe (Dublinand

Schengen Conventions, UNHCR (Aug. 16, 1991), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/operations/
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ing states that deterred migrants from reaching the region's shores.1 93 As such,
transnational migration deterrence was an established feature of the region's
migration control efforts and was one that European states turned to with the
influx of migration starting in 2015. In doing so, the use of migration detention
in the region proliferated. Today, migrants destined for Europe are increasingly
detained in offshore or transit state "facilities that are funded, built and resourced by the EU and its member states." 94 The prevalent use of detention to
deter migration into Europe has rendered the Mediterranean what one scholar
calls a "carceral seascape." 95
The creation of "hotspots" in EU external states is one significant part of
this seascape. As described by one scholar, these sites by design deter migration: "Hotspots should be seen as chokepoints of mobility disruption for capturing and slowing down migration." 96 The EU Parliament has characterized
these facilities as "[l]ocated at key arrival points in frontline Member States,
[and] designed to inject greater order into migration management by ensuring
that all those arriving are identified, registered and properly processed."1 97 The
EU formalized the hotspots approach to migration management in 2015, with
the first site opening on the Italian island of Lampedusa in September 2015.1 98
Hotspots blur the line between reception and detention' 99 and have been
plagued with serious human rights concerns, including severe overcrowding. 200
43662e942/unhcr-position-conventions-recently-concluded-europe-dublin-schengen-conventions.html
[https://penna.cc/QJE6-XCPR])); Cathryn Costello, The Asylum ProceduresDirective and the Proliferationof Safe Country Practices:Deterrence,Deflection andthe DismantlingofInternationalProtection?, 7 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 35,42 (2005) ("Most academic commentary onthe Dublin Convention has been overwhelmingly negative. It simply does not work." (citing Alberto Achermann & Mario
Gattiker, Safe Third Countries: EuropeanDevelopments, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 19, 22 (1995))).
193 Michael Flynn, There andBack Again: On the Diffusion ofImmigration Detention, 2 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 165, 185-86 (2014).
194 AKKERMAN, supra note 27,
at 3.
195 Maurice Stierl, The Mediterraneanas a CarceralSeascape,88 POL. GEOGRAPHY,
no. 102417,

2021, at 1, 1.
196 Tazzioli, supra note 176, at 2765.
19 7
MOUNTZ, supra note 40, at 61 (citation omitted). The term "hotspots" originated in the context
of criminology. See Tazzioli, supra note 176, at 2766 ("'Hotspot' is not a term that designates migration control hubs only. The nomenclature of hotspots had been firstly used in the 1990s in literature on
criminology and then had been adopted by the EU for designating 'logistical hotspots' of crime."
(footnote omitted) (citing Mark Neocleous & Maria Kastrinou, Commentary, The EUHotspot: Police
War Against the Migrant, RADICAL PHIL., Nov./Dec. 2016, at 1)).
198 Tazzoli, supra note 176, at 2764.
199 Id.
200 GAIA ROMEO, EUROMED RTS., THE NEW PACT ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM: THE GLOBAL

IMPACT 23 (Euromed Rights' Migration & Asylum Programme eds., 2021), https://euromedrights.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/05/EN 4AnalysisPACT.pdf[https://perma.cc/KXM6-N34G](notingthat
the hotspot "facilities are so horribly overcrowded that many people live intents or makeshift shelters
akin to 'slums' located in the area next to the proper hotspot," for example, "the occupancy rates at the
end of 2019 [in the Greek hotspots] ranged from 290% in Leros to 1200% in Samos").
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Amnesty International found incidents in the Lampedusa facility "where it's
less 'identify, screen and filter' and more a case of 'abuse, mislead and expel."' 201' Nonetheless, the EU continues to provide both financial and on-site
operational assistance for hotspots. 202
Another significant component of the Mediterranean detention regime is
the financial, tactical, and material support by Italy and the EU of the Libyan
Coast Guard's (LYCG) migration interdiction and detention system. Italy has
enlisted Libya's assistance in migration deterrence since 2000 through a series
of bilateral agreements, and until 2012 the two states operated a system ofjoint
patrols and migrant pushbacks. 203 As described more fully below, when the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in 2012 to hold Italy liable for
human rights abuses committed in its cooperation with Libya,204 Italy's response was to shift its role from patrolling with the LYCG to alerting them of
the presence of migrant vessels from a maritime coordination center in
Rome. 205 The ECHR ruling notwithstanding, after heightened migration to the
region in 2015, Italy and the EU memorialized a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2017 to provide training, equipment, and funding for the
LYCG.206 In 2020, the states renewed the MOU for an additional three years. 207
According to Amnesty International, between 2017 and 2020, "at least 40,000
people, including thousands of children, have been intercepted at sea, returned
to Libya and exposed to unimaginable suffering." 208 The International Organi20

i HotspotItaly: Abuses ofRefugees andMigrants, AMNESTY INT'L, https://www.amnesty.org/
en/latest/campaigns/2016/11/hotspot-italy/ [https://penna.cc/L9J9-P929].
202 MAJCHER ET AL., supra note 179, at 255 (2020) (noting that Frontex and EASO agents are
present at hotspots).
203 Azadeh Dastyari & Asher Hirsch, The Ring of Steel: Extraterritorial
MigrationControls in
Indonesia andLibya and the Complicity ofAustraliaandItaly, 19 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435, 446-47
(2019).
204 See infra notes 292-298 and accompanying text.
205 See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying
text.
206 Lorenzo Tondo, Italy to Renew Anti-migration Deal with Libya, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31,
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/31/italy-to-renew-anti-migration-deal-with-libya
[https://penna.cc/M7QG-VXRN].
207 Libya: Renewal ofMigrationDeal Confirms Italy's Complicity in Torture ofMigrants and
Refugees, AMNESTY INT'L (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/01/libyarenewal-of-migration-deal-confirms-italys-complicity-in-torture-of-migrants-and-refugees/ [https://
penna.cc/XWD4-RTPL].
20 8
Id. (quoting Marie Struthers, Reg'l Dir. E. Eur., Amnesty Int'l). These returns took place within the context of an unprecedented number of migrants stranded in Libya since the civil war and after
"European borders . . hardened since the 2015-16 migration crisis." Katie Kuschminder, Once a
DestinationforMigrants, Post-GaddafiLibya HasGonefrom TransitRouteto Containment, MIGRATIONPOL'YINST. (Aug. 6,2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/once-destination-migrantspost-gaddafi-libya-has-gone-transit-route-containment [https://penna.cc/C9KZ-H95F]. According to
2018 estimates by the International Organization for Migration, approximately 600,000 migrants in
Libya could be victims of human rights violations. Id
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zation for Migration reported that amidst the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020,
"71 percent of migrants in Libya claimed to have limited or no access to health
services."209
In addition to support for interdictions, the MOU includes provisions for
"temporary reception camps in Libya" with financial support from Italy and
the EU.210 The funding supports the approximately twenty-seven official detention centers in Libya and likely also the unofficial facilities under the control
of armed groups. 21 1 The United Nations has described the conditions in Libyan
detention facilities as inflicting "unimaginable horrors," including torture and
other mistreatment, forced labor, and rape. 21 2 Others have described unhygienic and overcrowded conditions, physical abuse, extortion, malnutrition, and
work exploitation. 2 13 There is no domestic judicial oversight of Libyan detention facilities.21 1
Despite well-documented evidence of the human rights violations caused
by the Italy-Libya agreement, the momentum regionally is to replicate this
model. In 2020, the European Commission published the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which includes proposing the prescreening of migrants by
intercepting their boats and placing them at an external border facility while
their cases are processed.2 15 The Pact also eliminates the principle that migration detention should only be utilized as a last resort. 2 16 Advocates have criticized the EC's Pact as encouraging the proliferation oftransnational migration

Kuschminder, supra note 208.
Dastyari & Hirsch, supra note 203, at 451-52.
211
Id. at 453.
2 12
209
210

U.N. SUPPORT MISSION IN LIBYA & OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTS., DESPERATE
AND DANGEROUS: REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN

&

LIBYA 4 (2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/LibyaMigrationReport.pdf [https://
penna.cc/3JUG-MMZ9].
23 Nowhere Safe: Cycle ofAbuses Against Refuges and Migrants in Libya, AMNESTY INT'L
(Sept. 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/09/nowhere-safe-cycle-of-abusesagainst-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya/ [https://penna.cc/5D9M-6N34]; Stierl, supra note 195, at 5
(documenting Bangladeshi migrants describing "being incarcerated shortly after arriving in Libya and
tortured by 'the mafia' as they referred to the criminal networks operating within Libya"); Dastyari
Hirsch, supra note 203, at 452-53 (describing the overcrowded and unhygienic conditions and reports
of physical and sexual abuse); AKKERMAN, supra note 27, at 4 (describing the conditions endured by
migrants in Libyan detention centers as "deeply inhumane").
214 Dastyari & Hirsch, supra note 203, at
453.
215 AKKERMAN, supra note 27, at
42.
216 The Pact on MigrationandAsylum: To Provide a Fresh StartandAvoidPastMistakes, Risky
ElementsNeed to Be Addressed andPositiveAspects Need to Be Expanded, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct.
8, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/08/pact-migration-and-asylum [https://perma.cc/PH78NWN7].
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detention, characterizing its objective of providing a "fresh start" for migration
control in the region "as a 'fresh start' only for human rights violations."217
Along these lines, in 2021, Denmark passed a law permitting the government to relocate asylum seekers to non-EU third countries while their cases are
processed. 2 18 Thereafter, the Danish government signed an agreement with
Rwanda to build a migrant "processing" facility. 219 Today, the EU and its
member states directly participate in the construction and operation of migration detention in at least seventeen countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the
Balkans and West Asia.220 There have been documented human rights abuses
in many of the facilities,22 ' but the degree of involvement by the EU with these
states with respect to migration detention varies.22 2 The future investment by
the EU for migration control, including building its transnational migration
deterrence system, is significant: between 2021 and 2027, the EU budget has
allocated $38.4 billion for migration controls. 223
C. Australia's TransnationalMigrationDeterrenceSystem
Prior to becoming a commonwealth, the Australian colonies followed
Britain's more lenient migration policy, which generally allowed noncitizen

217 ROMEO, supra note 200, at 4; see also DAPHNE PANAYOTATOS, REFUGEES INT'L, UNDERMINING PROTECTION IN THE EU: WHAT NINE TRENDS TELL US ABOUT THE PROPOSED PACT ON MIGRA-

TION AND ASYLUM 5 (2021), https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2021/6/1/underminingprotection-in-the-eu-what-nine-trends-tells-us-about-the-proposed-pact-on-migration-and-asylum
[https://perma.cc/WAY9-9THS] (arguing that the Pact "is likely to reproduce the conditions that created" the previous tragedies that it is purportedly trying to avoid in the future); Kemal Kirirci, M.
Murat Erdogan & Nihal Eminoglu, The EU's "New Pacton MigrationandAsylum" IsMissing a True
Foundation,BROOKINGS: ORDER FROM CHAOS (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
order-from-chaos/2020/11/06/the-eus-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-is-missing-a-true-foundation/
[https://penna.cc/WE9Z-LLQR] (asserting that to be successful, the Pact must recognize that developing countries host most refugees). Though the EU has yet to agree on the Pact, the European Commission has moved forward with the implementations of its provisions. PANAYOTATOS, supra, at 3.
2" DenmarkAsylum: Law Passedto Allow Offshore Asylum Centres, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57343572 [https://perna.cc/Z3VY-RPVB].
219 See id.
220 AKKERMAN, supra note 27, at 15. The states are Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Niger, North Macedonia, Senegal, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Id
221 Id at 28-31 (documenting human rights abuses in EU-funded detention and border control
operations in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine). For a timeline of Europe's path toward transnational
migration detention spanning from 2004 to the 2020 European Commission's New Pact on Migration
and Asylum, see id. at 13.
222 Direct influence of migrant detention policies in these states include "fund[ing] the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocat[ing] for detention in
other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa
requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention." Id. at 1.
223 WALIA, supra note 45, at 108.
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entry.224 The increased arrivals of Chinese migrants to the colonies in the midnineteenth century, however, led to the enactment of explicitly discriminatory
restrictive migration policies.225 In its first legislative act, the newly formed
Australian Commonwealth passed the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901,
which set out provisions to exclude non-white migrants and those who the
government considered politically objectionable. 226
Migration flows by sea toward Australia intensified in the 1970s,227 in
large part due to the "Indochinese exodus" beginning in 1975.228 Starting in
1979, the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines agreed to temporarily
host migrants while they were processed and prepared for resettlement in Australia and elsewhere. 229 This arrangement was a prelude to the modern-day
practice by Australia of restricting migrants' mobility by placing migrants in
states that are not their destination points. 2 30
The Australian government expanded its extraterritorial migration deterrence efforts in the late 1990s, when it began collaborating with Indonesian
enforcement authorities to collect intelligence and apprehend migrants destined forAustralia. 23 ' Around this same time, Australia enhanced significantly
its onshore enforcement policy by subjecting migrants who entered without
authorization to mandatory and indefinite detention. 232 The Australian government began building what has become a formidable transnational deterrence
regime with the implementation of the "Pacific Solution" in the months following 9/11.233 Conservative then-Prime Minister John Howard used the 9/11
224 Asher Lazarus Hirsch, The BordersBeyond the Border: Australia'sExtraterritorialMigration
Controls, 36 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 48,55 (2017) (stating that the new colonies followed Britain's Aliens
Act of 1836).
225 Id. Such policies included migrant carrier sanctions. Id at 59-60.
226
See id. at 56 (describing the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act as "the cornerstone of Austral-

ia's 'White Australia Policy', a policy which remained until the 1970s").
227 Gabrielle Holly, Challengesto Australia's Offshore DetentionRegime and the Limits ofStrategic Tort Litigation, 21 GERMAN L.J. 549, 551 (2020).
2

U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: FIFTY YEARS

OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 79 (2000) ("The upheavals which followed the communist victories in
1975 in the former French colonies of Indochina Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos-caused more than
three million people to flee these countries over the next two decades.").
229 Antje Missbach, Waitingon the Islands of 'Stuckedness. 'ManagingAsylum Seekers in Island
Detention Camps in Indonesia: From the Late

1970s to the Early 2000s, 6 AUSTRIAN J.S.-E.

STUD.

281, 288 (2013). A neighbor to Australia, the most popular destination country for migrants in the
Asian-Pacific region, Indonesia was a natural bufferto intercept migrants with its more than seventeen
thousand
islands, of which two-thirds are uninhabited. Id. at 283.
23
0Id. at 283.
231 Dastyari & Hirsch, supra note 203, at
441.
232 WALIA, supra note 45, at 98. This legislative change was in 1992, The Australian Human
Rights Commission reported in 2019 that the average length of detention in Australia's onshore detention facilities is five hundred days. Id.
233 Id. at 99; Holly, supra note 227, at 551.
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attacks to garner support for the policy, which, coupled with the recently enacted Border Protection Act, deployed Australian Navy ships to intercept migrants and send them to offshore detention sites. 2 34 Like the United States, the
Australian government has used "responsibility sharing" as a rationale for
building a transnational migration control system, which includes prolonged or
indefinite detention of migrants offshore in other states. 235 Influenced by the
U.S.-Caribbean model, Australia has expanded considerably its transnational
migration deterrence system over the past two decades. 236
D. MigrationDetentionAcross Asia and Oceania
Australia's reliance on island states to detain migrants has been a critical
element of its transnational migration deterrence regime. 237 Similar to its counterparts across the Americas and Europe, the Australian transnational system
has exposed migrants to serious human rights violations. Australia's offshore
migration detention centers have official names suggesting they are "processing" centers, which is deceptive nomenclature "because no genuine resettlement ever takes place." 238
As mentioned above, Australia relied on Indonesiato help manage migration from Southeast Asia starting in the 1970s, following the rise of Communist governments in the region. 239 Indonesia, as a "key transit country" for
unauthorized migration to Australia, 2 4 0 has played an increasingly important
role in Australia's transnational migration deterrence system. 24 ' In 2000, the
two states signed an agreement through which Australia funded the International Organization for Migration (IOM)'s efforts in Indonesia to control unau-

234 WALIA, supra note 45, at 99-100.

Taylor, supra note 157, at 7-8.
See discussion supra Part I.A; Frelick et al., supra note 16, at 204 ("[T]here is evidence to
suggest that Australian officials examined the US playbook in devising the Pacific Solution .... ").
237 Offshore detention is not just for arriving migrants: "Australia's tough immigration laws also
allow it to lock up what it terms 'unlawful non-citizens' like the Murugappans in detention for an
indefinite length of time -a policy that has also been strongly criticised by the UN and human rights
groups." Biloela: AustraliaPressuredto Free Refugee FamilyDetainedon Christmas Island, BBC
NEWS (June 9, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-57405107 [https://perma.cc/R7MFBUXU]; Rachael Bongiorno,AustraliaDetained This Familyon a Remote Island Alone, Posting to
Refugees, THE WORLD (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-03-24/australia-detainedfamily-remote-island-alone [https://perma.cc/6VHA-SBP2].
238 Ben Doherty, A Short History of Nauru, Australia'sDumping Groundfor Refugees, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/a-short-history-of-nauruaustralias-dumping-ground-for-refugees [https://perma.cc/H8AQ-TLFT].
239 See supra notes 237-23 9 and accompanying text.
240
Francesca Mussi & Nikolas Feith Tan, Comparing Cooperationon Migration Control: ItalyLibya andAustralia-Indonesia,10 IRISH Y.B. INT'L L. 87, 96-97 (2015).
235

236

241 Id.
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thorized migration, including funding migration detention centers. 24 2 Australia's continued financial and material support to Indonesia for migration control
has led Indonesia to expand considerably its migration detention capacity. Today Indonesia's migration detention system is funded entirely by Australia. 243
The conditions in these facilities have been reported to be violent, overcrowded, and otherwise in violation of international human rights norms. 2 4 4 There
also have been many reported migrant deaths in these detention centers. 245
As part of the Pacific Solution, Australia began funding efforts to prevent
boats from leaving Indonesia, rendering the state another example ofAustralia's "incentivised policy transfer" system. 24 6 Australia has proposed a system
of intercepting asylum seekers in the future, one that would transfer migrants
to Indonesia, and the Indonesian government would assume the responsibility
for processing their cases. 247 Indonesia receives ongoing financial incentives
and training from Australia "to construct detention centers and enhance its
border control measures." 248
The Australian government commenced the detention of migrants on the
island states of Nauru, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Christmas Island, an
Australian territory in the Indian Ocean, in 2001. The state's arrangement with
Nauru, the smallest island state in the world, was instigated by an event one
month prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks:
242 Id.
243 Asher Lazarus Hirsch & Cameron Doig, Outsourcing Control: The InternationalOrganization
for Migrationin Indonesia, 22 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 681, 691 (2018) (noting that Australia funds the
detention of asylum seekers in thirteen detention centers, twenty makeshift detention facilities, and
forty-two community housing facilities across Indonesia).
24
Dastyari & Hirsch, supra note 203, at 444 (noting that Human Rights Watch reported that the
conditions of Indonesian detention centers include "detainees being exposed to violence; collective
punishment by guards; mental harm; restrictions on their freedom of movement and communication;
unreliable and inadequate education programmes; overcrowding; delays in accessing emergency medical assistance; and insufficient nutrition, particularly for children" (first citing Amy Nethery, Brynna
Rafferty-Brown & Savitri Taylor, Exporting Detention: Australia-FundedImmigrationDetention in
Indonesia,26 J. REFUGEE STUD. 88, 104 (2012))); and then citingBarely Surviving: Detention, Abuse,
and Neglect ofMigrant Children in Indonesia, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 23, 2013), https://www.
hrw.org/report/2013/06/23/barely-surviving/detention-abuse-and-neglect-migrant-children-indonesia
[https://penna.cc/Q3RK-JQ3J]); Hirsh& Doig, supra note 243, at 691 (stating that the detention centers in Indonesia likely violate Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Article 7 of the Conventions on the Rights of the Child, and Article 16 of the Convention against
Torture).
245
246 Dastyari & Hirsch, supra note 203, at 444.
WALIA, supra note 45, at 100-0 1 ("Indonesia was pulled into the geopolitical orbit of White
Australia and colonial carcerality." (citing Amy Nethery & Carly Gordyn,Australia-IndonesiaCooperation on Asylum-Seekers: A Case of IncentivisedPolicyTransfer, '68 AUSTL. J. INT'L AFFS. 177,
177-93 (2014))).
247 Samuel Tyrer, An Australia-Indonesia
Arrangement on Refugees: Exploring the Structural,
Legal andDiplomatic Dimensions, 38 ADELAIDE L. REV. 113, 122-23 (2017).
241 WALIA, supra note 45, at 100-01.
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In August 2001, a Norwegian freighter, MV Tampa, rescued 433
mostly Afghan refugees and entered near the waters off Christmas
Island. After a tense standoff, during which Australia refused to accept the refugees, Australia struck a deal with Nauru and forcibly
transported most of the refugees there like cargo. Nauru, whose
ecology and economy was devastated through extractive colonialism, received a sizable thirty-million-dollar aid package in exchange.249
By 2014, Nauru's single largest source of income was Australian funding for
detention.2 50 At that time, the island state's detention facility held over 1,200
migrants who had hoped to seek asylum in Australia.2 5 I One scholar characterizes Nauru as having "s[old] [its] sovereignty" by exchanging financial support
for the responsibility of detaining and transferring refugees for Australia. 25 2
The United Nations, the Australian Human Rights Commission, and other human rights organizations reported severe mental health issues among the children and adult migrants held indefinitely at the Nauru center, as well as mistreatment including sexual assault and poor living conditions. 2 3 Nauru was
closed in 2008 but reopened in 2012.254 Due in part to an agreement with the
United States to resettle many ofthe migrants, the detention facility was again
closed in March 2019.255

24 9

Id. at 99 (citing Richard Wazana, FearandLoathingDown Under:AustralianRefugee Policy
and the NationalImagination, 22 REFUGEE 83, 83-95 (2004)).
5
1 1 Id. at 89.
251 Julia Hollingsworth & Angus Watson, TakingAustralia'sAsylum Seekers Was a Deal with
the Devil':FormerNauru Leader, CNN (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/18/australia/
nauru-former-president-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/4S6C-SM8C].
252 Hirsch, supra note 224, at 78; see also WALIA, supra note 45, at 100 ("The first two years
after the implementation of the Pacific Solution, Australia . . increased aid to Nauru, amounting to
one-third of the country's GDP."); Emma Larking, Controlling IrregularMigration in the AsiaPacific: Is AustraliaActing Against Its Own Interests?, 4 ASIA & PAC. POL'Y STUD. 85, 89 (2017)
(noting that in the past two decades, states have become reliant on the funding provided by Australia
to assist in migration control).
253 Australia Urged to Evacuate Offshore DetaineesAmid Widespread, Acute Mental Distress,
U.N. NEWS (Oct. 12, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/10/1022972 [https://penna.cc/6XD7YBDJ]; Pathwaysto Protection:A Human Rights-BasedResponse to the FlightofAsylum Seekers by

Sea, AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS. COMM'N (Sept. 13, 2016), https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/asylumseekers-and-refugees/publications/pathways-protection-human-rights-based-response [https://perma.
cc/57QL-PRR7];Australia:AppallingAbuse, NeglectofRefugees on Nauru, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug.
2, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/02/australia-appalling-abuse-neglect-refugees-nauru
[https://perma.cc/5EQ8-VTXL].
254 James Grubel, AustraliaReopens Asylum Detention in Nauru Tent City, REUTERS, Sept. 14,
2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-asylum/australia-reopens-asylum-detention-in-naurutent-city-idUSBRE88D07120120914 [https://penna.cc/A2WV-2YKS].
255 Hollingsworth & Watson, supra note
251.
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Australia also opened detention centers in PNG and the Christmas Island
in 2001, soon after the implementation of the Pacific Solution. 256 Journalists
have described PNG's facility, the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre,
as a "tropical purgatory" and "Australia's greatest modern controversy."2
Manus at one time held more than two thousand detainees, and was plagued
with mass hunger strikes and riots, murders, overcrowding, medical negligence, and incidents of detainee self-harm. 258 Like the United States and European states, Australia tied development aid to PNG's ability to support Australia's border deterrence measures. 259 The public condemnation in PNG for the
detention facility, however, was considerable, and in 2016 the PNG Supreme
Court issued a judgment that ultimately forced the closure of Manus. 260
The detention facility in Christmas Island is characterized by the island's
extreme remote location, where detainees do not have reliable access to cell
phone reception or internet connection. 2 6' The Christmas Island facility temporarily closed in 2018 but reopened in 2019.262 In early 2021 a riot erupted, ren256 S.L., The Grim History of ChristmasIsland, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.
economist.com/the-economist-explains/2020/01/31/the-grim-history-of-christmas-island [https://perma.
cc/PQ3 T-PDWH]; Manus: Timeline of ControversialAustralianDetention Centre, BB C NEWS (Oct.
31, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-41813219 [https://perma.cc/7YTZ-Z5NB].

257 Helen Davidson, 'Six Years and IDidn'tAchieveAnything': Inside Manus, A TropicalPurga-

tory, THE GUARDIAN (July 20, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jul/21/sixyears-and-i-didnt-achieve-anything-inside-manus-a-tropical-purgatory [https://perma.cc/ZMH8-WCNF].
25 Id.; see Manus: Timeline of ControversialAustralian Detention Centre, supra note 239.
259 Larking, supra note 252, at 89.
260 The Supreme Court found that the forceful detention of asylum seekers in Manus was
"unconstitutional and illegal" under the state's constitution and ordered the PNG and Australian governments
to end the detention of the asylum seekers. Namahv. Pato [2016] PGSC 13, para. 74 (Papua N.G.).
261 Paul Karp, FreshDisturbanceat ChristmasIsland Detention Centre Due to 'Inhumane' Con-

ditions, Advocates Say, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/australianews/2021/jan/10/fresh-disturbance-at-christmas-island-detention-centre-due-to-inhmnane-conditionsadvocates-say [https://perma.cc/7QAT-6HWC].
262 Statistics on People in Detention in Australia, REFUGEE COUNCIL OF AUSTL., https://www.
refugeecouncil.org.au/detention-australia-statistics/3/ [https://perma.cc/K4VA-59Y3] (Mar. 24, 2022).
The Christmas Island repetitive closures and reopenings demonstrate that in reality Australia's assisted migration detention systems are "embedded in a reiterative pattern of openings and closures which
mark the persistence, and indeed expansion, of confinement and punishment, rather than its 'end."'
Maria Giannacopoulos & Claire Loughnan, 'Closure'atManus Islandand CarceralExpansion in the
Open Air Prison, 17 GLOBALIZATIONS 1118, 1119-20 (2020) ("By tracking the patterns of penal
closures and openings which are utilized by the state to expand the boundaries of refugee punishment
we draw from and build on a significant body of literature that has for at least two decades connected
border violence of the Australian state with the imperial control of subjugated populations." (citations
omitted)). The Australian Human Rights Commission, citing overcrowded conditions in the Island's
detention centers, called for its closure particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Youssef Saudie, Christmas IslandShould Be Closed in Case of a COVID Outbreak, AustralianHuman Rights Commission Says, but No Cases to Date, ABC NEWS (June 18, 2021), https://www.abc.
net.au/news/2021-06-19/human-rights-commission-close-christmas-island-detention-centre/10022
3052 [https://perma.cc/HZA5-XYHL].
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dering conditions at the center to be "like a warzone."263 The Australian government has allocated $464.7 million over the next two years to increase its
migration detention capacity and to keep the Christmas Island detention facility operating. 264 For 2021-2022, Australia has earmarked almost $812 million
for its "offshore processing regime." 265
Juan Mendez, then-U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture and other forms of
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, found that the detention facilities funded by Australia "amounted to a systemic violation of the
Convention against Torture." 266 Despite this and considerable evidence that
Australia is assisting in the perpetration of grave human rights violations
against migrants, the transnational migration deterrence regime it orchestrates
persists virtually undeterred. Australia, European states, and the United States
have built a global migration control system that has fundamentally challenged
the international human rights protection regime. These states' future plans to
enhance these mechanisms should be met with endeavors by international and
regional human rights bodies to intervene on behalf of vulnerable migrants.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Arrangements that constitute transnational migration deterrence involve a
close and cooperative relationship between assisting and acting states. They
are systems, however, that often contravene the protections provided by the
Refugee Convention and the international law principle of non-refoulement.267
263 Karp, supra note 261 (quoting Filipa Payne, Campaigner for New Zealanders
in Australian
Detention).
264 Press Release, Paul Power, CEO of the Refugee Council of Austl., Govt Chooses
Detention
Over Hope for World's Refugees in Budget (May 21, 2021), https://reliefweb.int/report/australia/govtchooses-detention-over-hope-world-s-refugees-budget [https://perma.cc/TS56-7V5Z].
265
Ben Doherty, Budget Immigration Cost: Australia Will SpendAlmost $3.4m for Each Person
in Offshore Detention, THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/australianews/2021/may/12/australia-will-spend-almost-3 4m-for-each-person-in-offshore-detention-budgetshows [https://penna.cc/FK5J-RCJC]. Though there is funding from Australia to the states in which
migration detention facilities are located, in the form of development aid and other sources, most
profits benefit contractors and corporations particularly given that private contractors operate all of
Australia's migration detention facilities, including the offshore facilities. Mussi & Tan, supra note
240, at 92.
266 AKKERMAN, supra note 27, at 12; see also Elahe Zivardar & Omid Tofighian, The Torture of

Australia's Offshore Immigration Detention System, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Mar. 16, 2021), https://

www. opendemocracy. net/en/beyond-trafficking-and-slavery/the-torture-of-australias-offshoreimmigration-detention-system/ [https://perma.cc/6TNH-8JBJ] ("[Australia's] influence is inspiring
and it facilitates crimes against humanity on a global scale.").
267
The principle of non-refoulement prohibits states from returning a noncitizen to a territory
where "there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of irreparable harm
upon return, including persecution, torture, ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations."
U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R, THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT UNDER INTER-
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At the same time, transnational deterrence regimes have allowed states, in particular assisting states, to evade judicial scrutiny for these and other violations
of law. 268 In fact, scholars have described transnational deterrence as "contactless control" to convey how assisting states design migration deterrence in a
manner that eludes jurisdictional links to the acting state. 269 One example, discussed infra, is Italy's decision to halt use of its military ships to assist Libyan
authorities in the interception of migrants while continuing to play a coordinating role. 270
There is not a designated court or mechanism to bring human rights abuse
grievances perpetuated within transnational migration deterrence systems. 2 7
Domestic courts, in both assisting and acting states, constitute one set of venues where migrants have brought legal actions. Courts in assisting states, unsurprisingly perhaps, have limited the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction
in cases alleging human rights violations outside their physical borders. 272Australia's domestic courts, for example, have denied state responsibility for the
conditions of offshore detention sites. 273 In 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court held
in Hernandez v Mesa2 74 that the parents of a Mexican teenager, who was on
the Mexico side of the border when a U.S. border agent standing on the U.S.
side shot him dead, did not have the right to pursue a domestic damages claim.
Through the Hernandezdecision, the Court demonstrated the extent to which
domestic courts are weary of holding its government officials liable for extraterritorial claims involving migration control.

NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migmtion/Global
CompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon-RefoulementUnderIntemationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf [https://
perma.cc/45S8-DVHE].
268 TomDe Boer, ClosingLegal BlackHoles: The Role ofExtraterritorial
Jurisdictionin Refugee
Rights Protection, 38 J. REFUGEE STUD. 118, 119 (2014) (stating that "extraterritorialization . .
do[es] not just restrict the protection of refugees within the international refugee law regime, [it] actually serve[s] to evade the regime as a whole, including the judicial scrutiny of courts").
269 Mariagiulia Giuffrd & Violeta Moreno-Lax, The Rise of Consensual Containment: From
'Contactless Control' to 'ContactlessResponsibility'for ForcedMigration Flows, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 82, 87 (Satvinder Singh Juss ed., 2019).
270 See infra notes 293-304 and accompanying text.
271 Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 24, at 155 ("The absence of a dedicated international court or
other supranational supervisory mechanism in the field of migration and refugee law further meant
that concrete legal challenges to transnational migration control were largely dependent on national
avenues for adjudication.").
2 2
1Id. at 156; see also Monika Heupel, IndirectAccountabilityforExtraterritorial
Human Rights
Violations, 21 INT'L STUD. PERSPS. 172, 174 (2020) ("Domestic publics tend to lack the motivation to
hold their own governments to account for rights violations that harm foreigners only, not nationals.").
273 Holly, supra note 227, at 549-69 (detailing Australia's complex political and legal environment, rendering it difficult to prevail on human rights claims against its "offshore detention regime").
274 140 S. Ct. 735, 739 (2020).

13 38

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 63 :1295

Given the power imbalance that exists in transnational migration deterrence arrangements, domestic courts in acting states are, as a general matter,
unreliable venues for accountability for human rights violations carried out in
these systems. The one notable exception is the Papua New Guinea Supreme
Court decision that forced the closure of the Manus migration detention center.275 There are other instances, however, as in the case in Libya, where the
domestic courts do not even have the power to review the detention system. 276
Consequently, there is a need for international accountability mechanisms in
order to ensure that international human rights norms are respected. Conceptualizing jurisdiction in a manner that recognizes the critical, and often decisive,
role of assisting states in the creation and operation of transnational migration
deterrence systems is key for this type of human rights review, and for judicial
bodies to assume a meaningful oversight role.
Section A of this part discusses the possibility of expanding our concept
ofjurisdiction in order to allow international human rights bodies to hold states
accountable for transnational human rights violations. 277 Section B posits several factors that could be useful in determining responsibility for transnational
offenses.278
A. InternationalHuman Rights Bodies and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
International and regional human rights bodies represent possible venues
for holding states accountable within transnational migration deterrence systems. In these venues, there have been important developments regarding jurisdiction and territoriality that favor accountability.
The law of jurisdiction has evolved beyond exclusively territorial control. 2 79 The U.N. Human Rights Committee 280 and the International Court of
Justice 281 both have recognized the importance of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
international human rights law. Refugee law, particularly the principle of nonrefoulement, supports a concept ofjurisdiction in the context of migration con-

275 Giannacopoulos & Loughnan, supra note 262, at 118; Nikolas Feith Tan, The Manus Island
RegionalProcessingCentre: A Legal Taxonomy, 20 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 427, 428 (2018).
276 See supra note 214 and accompanying teXt.
277 See infra notes 279-304 and accompanying
text.
278 See infra notes 305-343 and accompanying
text.
279 Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 13, at 243.
280 The U.N. Human Rights Committee made its statement with respect to states' obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id. at 259-60 (citing U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (Mar. 29, 2004)).
28
Id. at 260 (citing Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall inthe Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 109 (July 9)).
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trol that reaches beyond territorial state borders. 282 In this vein, a 2017 joint
comment by the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child (CRC) and the Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers emphasized that the principle of nonrefoulement applies everywhere that a state exercises full or partial jurisdiction,
"including in international waters or other transit zones where States put in
place migration control mechanisms." 283 This legal interpretation provides an
opportunity to hold assisting states accountable for human rights violations
against migrants before U.N. bodies. For example, advocates could utilize the
complaint procedure under the CRC to hold Libya, 284 Italy, 285 Mexico, 286 Australia, 287 and Indonesia 288 accountable for violations of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, including Articles 3 and 6, committed in the course of the
states' transnational migration deterrence mechanisms.289
The ECHR has taken a gradual path toward the acknowledgement of extraterritorial jurisdiction for human rights violations. In a case involving the
bombing of the former Yugoslavia by North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) states resulting in civilian deaths, the ECHR in Bankovit v Belgium in
1999 held that human rights protection should be extended beyond territorial
jurisdiction only in "exceptional" cases that demonstrate "special justification." 290 A decade later in 2011, however, the ECHR in Al-Skeini v United

2 82

Id. at 257-58 ("While the majority of rights are explicitly reserved for refugees who are physically present in the territory or who have some higher level of attachment to the host state, a few core
rights including the duty of non-refoulement are intentionally said to apply without territorial or
other qualification."); see Gammeltoft-Hansen supra note 271, at 160 ("Non-refoulementtoday constitutes the single most petitioned issues across all UN human rights committees .... " (citing Barak
Qali, Cathryn Costello & Stewart Cunningham, Hard Protection Through Soft Courts? Nonrefoulment Before the UnitedNations Treaty Bodies, 21 GERMAN L.J. 355, 360 (2020))).
283 Comm. on the Prot. of the Rts. of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Fams. & Comm.
on the Rts. of the Child, Joint General Comment No. 3 (2017) of the Committee on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and No. 22 (2017) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the General Principles regarding the Human Rights of Children in the
context of International Migration, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CMW/C/GC/3- CRC/C/GC/22 (Nov. 16, 2017).
284 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
285 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
286 See supra notes 116-117, 130 and accompanying text.
287 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
288 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
289 The Committee on the Rights of the Child permits individual complaints or communications,
but the Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers' ability to facilitate similar complaints awaits
approval by state parties (in accordance with Article 77 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families). The United States has
signed, but has not ratified, the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
290 Bankovi6 v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 352; see also Violeta Moreno-Lax, The
Architecture ofFunctionalJurisdiction:Unpacking ContactlessControl On PublicPowers, S.S. and
Others v. Italy, and the "OperationalModel," 21 GERMAN L.J. 385, 398 (2020) ("In Bankovic the
Court likened the term 'jurisdiction' to the concept of a legal title under international law, thus affirm-
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Kingdom recognized the need to modify its position to provide for more accountability, given that states "exercise human rights jurisdiction beyond their
territory in an increasing number of situations." 291
Soon after the Al-Skeini ruling, the ECHR issued a ruling that attached liability for human rights violations to an assisting state in the context of transnational migration deterrence, 292 specifically concerning the arrangement between Italy and Libya. In 2012, in HirsiJamaav. Italy,293 which was the first
ECHR ruling involving interceptions at sea, 2 94 the applicants were eleven Somali migrants and thirteen Eritrean migrants who had tried to reach Italy by
boat in a group of around 200 migrants. 295 Italian police and coast guard intercepted their vessel, transferred the migrants onto Italian military ships, and
later handed them over to Libyan authorities. 296 The court found that the forced
return of the migrants without any individual processing constituted several
violations ofthe European Convention on Human Rights, including Article 3's
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. 2 97 The ECHR ruled that the
violations fell within Italy's jurisdiction given that the applicants first embarked
upon ships of the Italian armed forces with crews composed entirely of Italian
military personnel who then transferred the applicants to Libyan authorities. 298
In response to ECHR's ruling, Italy halted the use of its military ships in
migrant vessel interdiction efforts with Libya. Still, advocates went back to the
ECHR and, in S.S. v. Italy,299 they argued that Italy's coordination role in a resing that 'the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial."' (citingBankovic, 2001-XII
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 351-52)).
291 Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 13, at 261 (citing Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom,
2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99). The Court inAl-Skeini v. United Kingdom held that the European Convention on Human Rights applied to British soldiers acting not just on the British military base in Iraq,
but also in the areas surrounding the base in Basrah. Wells Bennett, The ExtraterritorialEffect of
HumanRights: The ECHR 'sAl-Skeini Decision, LAWFARE (July 12, 2011), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/extraterritorial-effect-human-rights-echrs-al-skeini-decision [https://penna.cc/C2NG-RMPB].
292 In cases of extrajudicial rendition, the ECHR has held states in whichU.S. intelligence agents
captured individuals responsible for their detention and torture even though the U.S. agents carried out
human rights abuses outside the states' borders. E.g., El-Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, 2012-VI Eur. Ct. 263, 267; Nasr & Ghali v. Italy, App. No. 44883/09 (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-162280%22]} [htps://perma.cc/UK35-L74N].
293 Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
97.
294 Marie-Bdnddicte Dembour, Interception-at-Sea: Illegal as Currently
Practiced Hirsi and
Others v. Italy, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Mar. 1, 2012), https://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/03/
01/interception-at-sea-illegal-as-currently-practiced-hirsi-and-others-v-italy/ [https://perma.cc/G44MEAYV].
295 HirsiJamaa, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 99.
296
297

Id.

Id. at 133, 134-39.

Dembour, supra note 294.
S.S. v. Italy, App. No. 21660/18 (May 3, 2018), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194748
[https://perma.cc/6MFP-8YXE#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-194748%22]}]. The Global Legal Action
298

299
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cue operation--where the Libyan coast guard mistreated migrants and caused
several to die--renders Italy liable for the human rights violations. S. S., which
is still pending before the ECHR, involves the LYCG's interception of a migrant boat after the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) informed the LYCG of its location. 300 The arrival of the LYCG, which was via a
patrol vessel given by Italy, and the subsequent obstruction by the LYCG of
rescue attempts by a NGO vessel, caused "the death of at least twenty [migrants] ."301 A rescue boat operated by a humanitarian organization was able to
save fifty-nine migrants, bringing forty-seven of them back to Libya.302
A joint third-party intervention submitted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the court provided findings on the continuing inhumane conditions and abuses against migrants, including indefinite detention, committed
or permitted by Libyan authorities. 303 Importantly, the intervention argues that
Italy remains liable for these abuses because it "plays a decisive role in supporting and influencing Libyan migration control to pursue the same policies
of intercepting migrants [at] sea and returning them to Libya" as when the
court issued its opinion in HirsiJamaa.304
B. Factors to Hold Assisting States Accountable
As the NGOs' intervention in S.S. suggests, factors such as support and
influence by an assisting state in the operation of transnational migration deterrence systems should render the assisting state liable for human rights violations caused by such systems. The consideration of factors outside territorial
Network, the Italian Association for Juridical Studies, and the Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law
School filed the petition.
3 See Moreno-Lax, supra note 290, at 388.
301 Andreina De Leo, S.S. and Others v. Italy: Sharing Responsibilityfor MigrantsAbuses in
Libya, PUB. INT'L L. & POL'Y GRP. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.publicintemationallawandpolicygroup.
org/lawyering-justice-blog/2020/4/23/ss-and-others-v-italy-sharing-responsibility-for-migrantsabuses-in-libya [https://perma.cc/9RDE-XVF5].
30 2
Id.
303 Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty InternationalPublicStatement, Al Index EUR 30/1392/2019 (Nov. 13,
2019), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EUR3013922019ENGLISH.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7KC8-V4TV]. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch submitted the intervention
jointly. A third-party intervention in S.S. v. Italy was also filed by the International Commission of
Jurists, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the Dutch Refugee Council, and the AIRE
Centre. See ICJandOthersIntervene in MediterraneanSea Search andRescue Case Before Europe-

an Court Video Interview, INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.icj.org/icj-andothers-intervene-in-mediterranean-sea-search-and-rescue-case-before-european-court/ [https://pemna.
cc/6HP8-GDKZ].
304 Italy Shares Responsibilityfor Libya Abuses Against Migrants, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 13,
2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/13/italy-shares-responsibility-libya-abuses-against-migrants
[https://perma.cc/4ACS-JBR7] (emphasis added); ICJ and Others Intervene in MediterraneanSea
Search andRescue Case Before European Court Video Interview, supra note 303.
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presence to determine liability in migration control efforts would allow human
rights bodies to more comprehensively protect vulnerable migrants in this era
of transnational deterrence regimes.
This Section explores potential standards to determine when a state should
be subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Subsection 1 discusses the factors of
"functional jurisdiction and decisive impact." 305 Subsection 2 examines the idea
of labeling states as "co-perpetrators of wrongful conduct." 306 Subsection 3 considers applying the extraterritorial effects doctrine to the migration context. 307
1. Functional Jurisdiction and Decisive Impact
Professor Violeta Moreno-Lax presents the S. S. case as demonstrative of
extraterritorial acts by Italy that provide the ECHR "functional jurisdiction" 308
over Italy for human rights violations carried out by Libyan officials. The first
factor, the concept of functional jurisdiction, examines whether the assisting
state has "effective control," 309 defined as "when [the control] is determinative
of the material course of events unlocked by the exercise of jurisdiction, even
when the relevant activity takes place from a distance." 3 10 A second factor is
whether the assisting state maintained significant influence over the transnational operation, including providing funding and other material support. 311
The last factor determinative for functional jurisdiction is whether the assisting
state maintained overall control. 312
Moreno-Lax describes the functional jurisdiction approach as providing
more predictability than alternative approaches insofar as outcomes. 313 Perhaps
more importantly, this conceptualization moves reviewing and adjudicating
bodies away from a territorially bounded interpretation of jurisdiction. 314 The
factors Moreno-Lax lays out to determine whether functional jurisdiction is
applicable are, however, over-restrictive, given that assisting states' liability
depends on whether they perform either a coordination or operational role. As
305 See infra notes 308-319

and accompanying text.
See infra notes 320-325 and accompanying text.
307 See infra notes 326-343 and accompanying text.
308 Moreno-Lax, supra note 290, at 387, 401.
306

3 09
Id. at 387 (citation omitted). Moreno-Lax also used the term "situational control," and defines
this as "the exercise of public powers, such as those ordinarily assumed by a territorial sovereign,
taking the form of policy delivery and/or operational action." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Al-Skeini
v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 172).
310 Id. at 403 (citing Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97).
311
Id. at 408-11.
312
Id. at 411-13.
313 The alternative approaches identified include analyzing relative control and the "cause-andeffect relationship" and relying on whether the obligation in question involves positive or negative
duties. Id. at 386.
14 See Shachar, supra note 19, at 101.
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Moreno-Lax describes, in S.S. the level of Italy's involvement Libya was essentially "a subrogate Italian proxy for interdiction and pull-back at sea. "315
The Italy-Libya example, however, should not be the benchmark for finding
assisting states accountable for human rights violations of migrants in transnational migration deterrence arrangements.
Instead, assisting states should be held liable in situations where they
have had a decisive impact on the creation and continued functioning of a
transnational migration deterrence mechanism. Decisive impact could take the
form of diplomatic, political, and/or economic pressure. The Trump Administration's leverage of these tactics, for example, compelled the Northern Triangle states to enter into ACAs to process claims of migrants returned by the
United States, 3 16 despite the fact that none of the states had a functioning asylum adjudication system. 317 Under a decisive impact analysis, the United States
may face liability for human rights violations endured by migrants who it returned under the ACAs.
Financial incentives, including development aid, may also be characterized as having a decisive impact on the creation and ongoing operation of a
transnational migration deterrence system. Similarly, capacity-building assistance, such as the provision of equipment and training, may constitute decisive
impact. The substantial funding and support the U.S. government has provided
to Mexico, 318 and the Australian government to Indonesia, 319 may also render
these acting governments responsible for human rights violations, for example,
in Mexican and Indonesian migration detention facilities. In a decisive impact
framework, assisting states' role in the existence and ongoing operation of a
transnational deterrence mechanism is determinative, instead of applying a
threshold of coordination or operational involvement.
2. Co-Perpetrators of Wrongful Conduct
Article 16 of the United Nation International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts represents "an emerging consensus that international law will hold state responsible
for aiding or assisting another state's wrongful conduct." 320Article 16 address31 Moreno-Lax, supra note 290, at 412.
316 See supra notes 155-168 and accompanying text.
317 See supra note 167 and accompanying
text.
3" See supra notes 96-121 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 224-266 and accompanying
text.
320 Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 13, at 277 (first
citing HELMUT PHILIPP AUST,
COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE (2013); then citing JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBIL-

ITY: THE GENERAL PART (2013); then citing Jillian Button, SpiritedAway (Into a LegalBlackHole?):
The ChallengeofInvoking State Responsibilityfor ExtraordinaryRendition, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 531
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es assisting state liability in "cases where one State provides aid or assistance
to another State with a view to assisting the commission of a wrongful act by
the latter." 321 As "co-perpetrators or co-participants," the objective of Article 16 is to hold both assisting and acting states accountable. 322 The Article
limits the scope of acts that meet its definition of responsible transnational
conduct in three ways:
First, the relevant State organ or agency providing aid or assistance
must be aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State international wrongful; secondly, the aid or assistance
must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of that act,
and must actually do so; and thirdly, the completed act must be such
that it would have been wrongful had it been committed by the assisting State itself 323
The Italy-Libya arrangement created by the 2017 bilateral agreement likely would render the states co-perpetrators under Article 16. The dismal human
rights conditions in post-civil war Libya generally are well-documented, and
the ECHR judgment in Hirsi Jamaa specifically renders Italy aware of human
rights violations of migrants in Libya. The facts of the S.S. case, as compiled
by the research institute Forensic Oceanography, 32 4 demonstrate that Italian
authorities acted with a view to facilitate the return of migrants to Libya, and
actually did so. Lastly, the circumstances causing migrant deaths at sea in S. S.
and the mistreatment of the applicants returned to Libya would have been
wrongful if committed by Italy itself. Assisting states' conduct that does not
fall under Article 16 still could be captured by a decisive impact test as discussed above 325 or by the extraterritorial effects doctrine discussed below.

(2007); then citing Mark Gibney, Katarina Tomasevski & Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Transnational State
Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 267 (1999); then citing
Vaughan Lowe, Responsibilityforthe Conduct ofOther States, 101 J. INT'L L. & DIPL. 1 (2002); then
citing Georg Nolte & Helmut Philipp Aust, Equivocal Helpers Complicit States, Mixed Messages
and InternationalLaw, 58 INT'L & COMPAR. L.Q. 1 (2009); and then citing John Quigley, Complicity
in InternationalLaw: A New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility, 1986 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
77). Though the ILC Articles are not binding, Article 16 has "garnered wide support as a matter of
state practice and opinio juris." Id. (citing AUST, supra, at 107-91).
321
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work ofIts Fifty-Third Session, 56 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
322 Id. ("Under article 16, aid or assistance by the assisting State is not to be confused with the
responsibility of the acting State.").
323 Id.
324 Moreno-Lax, supra note 290, at
388.
325 See supra notes 320-325 and accompanying text.
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3. The Extraterritorial Effects Doctrine and Human Rights Due Diligence
There is a growing call for the application ofthe extraterritorial effects doctrine in relation to migration control. 3 26 The doctrine, which is both a domestic
and international legal principle, 327 recognizes that a court may exercise jurisdiction over conduct committed within a state's borders when that conduct has, or is
intended to have, an effect outside its boundaries. 328 Importantly, it does not require that the assisting state act extraterritorially. Tribunals have applied the extraterritorial effects doctrine in a range of areas, including labor, 329 cybersecurity,330 and anti-trust. 331 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also has applied
the doctrine specifically in cases involving environmental damage. 332
Scholars have called for more research on the doctrine's applicability to
transnational migration deterrence arrangements, recognizing the viability of
extraterritorial effects jurisdiction established by "a combination of funding,
training and directing migration control performed by third State authorities." 333 In this regard, a reconceptualization of assisting states' liability
through extraterritorial effects has broader applicability than functional jurisdiction. It also has a more expansive reach vis-a-vis assisting states' accountability than International Law Commission (ILC)'s Article 16. For example,
326
See infra notes 326-329 and accompanying text; see also Nadja Airaksinen, State Jurisdiction
in Search and Rescue Operations: The Extraterritorial Reach of the European Convention on Human
Rights and S.S. and Others v. Italy 2 (2020) (LLM thesis, Lund University) (on file with the Lund
University) (applying the extraterritorial effects doctrine to S.S. v. Italy).
327 For an example of the doctrine as applied between U.S. states, see Keselica v. Commonwealth, 480 S.E.2d 756, 759 (Va. 1997); see also Susan Lorde Martin, The ExtraterritorialityDoctrine of the Dormant Commerce ClauseIs Not Dead, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 497, 502-14 (2016) (discussing examples of U.S. cases that have implicated extraterritoriality).
328 State v. Jack, 125 P.3d 311, 319 (Alaska 2005); Jason Coppel, Student Contribution, A Hard
Look at the Effects DoctrineofJurisdiction in PublicInternationalLaw, 6 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 73, 73
(1993); Najeeb Samie, ExtraterritorialEnforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The British Reaction, 7
INT'L TRADE L.J. 58, 59 (1981).
329 Harry Arthurs, Extraterritorialityby Other Means: How Labor Law SneaksAcross Borders,
Conquers Minds, and Controls Workplaces Abroad, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 527, 538 (2010).
330 Mireille Hildebrandt, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
to Enforce in Cyberspace?Bodin, Schmitt,
Grotius in Cyberspace, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 196, 218 (2013).
331 Tony A. Freyer, Restrictive Trade PracticesandExtraterritorialApplication
ofAntitrust Legislation in Japanese-AmericanTrade, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMPAR. L. 159, 160 (1999); Coppel, supra note 328, at 74; Samie, supra note 328, at 61.
332 In Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ held that, states must "ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226,
¶ 27 (July 8) (citation omitted). In 2010, in the Pulp Mills case, the ICJ upheld this idea, acknowledging the "interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared resource and the
balance between economic development and environmental protection"). Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 177 (Apr. 20).
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under an extraterritorial effects analysis, the U.S. government's development
and security aid to Mexico and Central America may render the United States
responsible for human rights violations of migrants in the region. The inhumane conditions of the ad hoc detention sites caused by U.S. officials returning
migrants to Mexico under the Migrant Protection Protocol (MPP) may also be
the U.S. government's responsibility under an extraterritorial effects analysis.
Human rights due diligence obligations constitute another approach particularly to assist in the prevention of extraterritorial migration control arrangements that "thrive on willful blindness." 334 Due diligence obligations
have gained significant traction in the context of holding corporations accountable for ensuring that transnational business practices do not involve human
rights abuses, 335 and is an accountability concept recognized by international
law bodies, including the U.N. Human Rights Committee. 336 A law enacted in
France in 2017 provides a model for mandating corporate human rights due
diligence because it "applies to the company's own activities, activities of
companies under its control (such as subsidiaries), as well as activities of third
parties such as contractors and suppliers." 337 The French law also gives victims
a right of action to seek compensation for damages. 338
Due diligence, in essence, encompasses "a standard of conduct required
to avoid a likely or foreseeable undesirable outcome." 339 The obligation to exercise due diligence was pivotal to the ICJ's decision in The Corfu Channel
Case, where the Court held that Albanian authorities were obligated to disclose
the presence of a minefield and to warn those at risk of imminent danger. 340 In
the human rights context, a state's capacity to influence another state has a di-
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335
See Rachel Chambers & Anil Yilmaz Vastardis, Human Rights DisclosureandDue Diligence
Laws: The Role ofRegulatory Oversight in Ensuring CorporateAccountability, 21 CHI. J. INT'L L.
323, 323 (2021); Michael K. Addo, Is Business andHuman Rights Suitablefor the ComplianceFunc-

tion?, UNIV. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE, Jan. 7, 2020, at *4, *6, https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/
01/07/is-business-and-human-rights-suitable-for-the-compliance-function-by-michael-k-addo/ [https://
perma.cc/K7SD-KPFL]; Ronald C. Brown, Due Diligence "HardLaw " Remediesfor MNCLabor
Chain Workers, 22 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 119, 120-22 (2018).
336 Ferstman, supra note 334, at 467.
3? Robert McCorquodale, Lise Smit, Stuart Neely & Robin Brooks, Human Rights Due Diligence in Law andPractice:Good PracticesandChallengesfor Business Enterprises, 2 BUS. & HUM.

RTS. J. 195, 202 (2017).
338

Id

339 Ferstman, supra note 334, at 464.
3

The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4,22 (Apr. 9).

20221

TransnationalMigrationDeterrence

1347

rect relationship to the level of diligence that should be required.341The imposition of human rights due diligence on assisting states in the context of transnational migration deterrence would render these states affirmatively responsible for ensuring that migration control mechanisms operated by acting states
do not involve human rights abuses. The Australian government's funding for
approximately seventy-five migration detention facilities in Indonesia, 342 for
example, would be accompanied by a duty to address the serious human rights
violations reported in these sites. 343 Coupled with an oversight and accountability mechanism, human rights due diligence potentially can significantly improve the treatment of migrants in transnational migration control systems.
CONCLUSION

The modern global migration control system increasingly relies on transnational arrangements that both restrict human mobility and create greater
conditions for human rights violations. The operationalization of these systems, which have included the proliferation of migration detention practices,
rely on substantial and ongoing support from destination states to adjacent and
neighboring states to do the work of migration control for them. Despite their
critical role, assisting states largely have evaded responsibility for deaths
caused by and serious abuses perpetrated within transnational migration deterrence systems. Persistent impunity against these offenses incentivizes states to
further the global trend of reproducing and fortifying these systems. The
framework of transnational migration deterrence promotes a linguistic shift
that reconceptualizes externalized border control which, when accompanied by
accountability mechanisms, is positioned to hold destination states accountable
for human rights violations beyond their borders.
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